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Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) as it affects the legal definition of
disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), and eligibility for
coverage for postsecondary education. The first manuscript is a review of the literature
discussing the changes in the legal standards under the ADA following the enactment of
the ADAAA. The literature review presents the interpretation of experts in the field and
implications for coverage of students in postsecondary education, including the affect
upon documentation needed to meet the legal coverage standard. The second manuscript
is a research study addressing the new definition of disability set forth in the ADAAA
utilizing legal research methodology. This study provides a comprehensive analysis of
the changes in the legal definition of disability through assessment of legislative history,
statutory language, regulatory language and case law. The third manuscript provides
practical guidance to secondary education professionals that assist students with
disabilities in transition from high school to college. This manuscript addresses how
documentation of functional limitation has become more relevant to postsecondary
education and how appropriate documentation can be developed for transition from high
school to college.
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Abstract
The main purpose of the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008
(ADAAA) was to restore the original intention of Congress in enacting the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which had been abrogated by a series of restrictive
rulings from the United States Supreme Court, United States Court of Appeals, and
United States District Court. The purpose of this study is to research the legal standard
for coverage under the ADA as amended through a comprehensive review of the relevant
literature on this topic. The literature review will provide guidance to help direct further
study through legal research and analysis concerning eligibility determinations under the
ADA.
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The Legal Interpretation of Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
and Changes in this Standard Set Forth in the Americans with Disabilities Act
Amendments Act of 2008
Introduction
The Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) was passed
by Congress in 2008 and became effective on January 1, 2009. The main purpose of this
legislation was to restore the original intention of Congress in enacting the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which had been abrogated by a series of restrictive
judicial rulings from the United States Supreme Court, and various lower federal courts at
both the appellate and trial levels. Congress further determined the need to clarify the
original intent for broad inclusion of individuals with disabilities, including
postsecondary education students, as protected class members under the law.
The ADAAA mandates broad coverage to the maximum extent permitted by law
in relation to the original ADA, and that the determination of whether a person is an
individual with a disability should not demand extensive analysis (ADAAA Section 2(b),
2008). Determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity
must now be made without consideration of the ameliorative effects of mitigating
measures, and the terms substantially limits and major life activity must be construed
broadly. Congress ordered new administrative regulations to be issued to further define
disability in terms of substantial limitation of a major life activity.
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The focus under the new law will be on prevention of discrimination, which
includes the provision of reasonable accommodations. At this time, the scope of this new
legal standard is not clear. This paper will provide an analysis of the literature on how
the ADA requirement of establishing a substantial limitation of a major life activity has
previously been interpreted, and how this requirement has been changed by the ADAAA.
First, the ADA of 1990 will be described including key court cases from the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section
504), the predecessor legislation to the ADA of 1990, will also be addressed. Finally, the
analysis will continue onto the ADAAA of 2008 that made substantial changes to the
original ADA of 1990.
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
In order to understand the changes in the law enacted by the ADAAA, it is
necessary to understand the development and history behind the original ADA. The roots
or beginnings of the ADA are directly linked to the civil rights legislation of the 1960’s
enacted by Congress after the Supreme Court established that the constitution required
inclusion as opposed to separation in the context of race in Brown v. Board of Education
(1954). Related legislation includes the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (Karger & Rose, 2010). Congress then
enacted the Rehabilitation Act in 1973 that broadly prohibited discrimination based on
disability. This law prohibited discrimination on the basis of disability against individuals
that were otherwise qualified to participate in federally funded programs. The
Rehabilitation Act contained several sections with various applications. Section 501
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applied to the federal government, Section 503 to federal contractors, and Section 504
applied to recipients of federal financial assistance (Rothstein, 2006, chap. 1).
Slack (2009) noted that the enactments of disability discrimination legislation
through Section 504 may be viewed historically as a continuation of Civil Rights Acts
legislation that ultimately led to the enactment of the ADA. Section 504 applied to
postsecondary education before the ADA and continues to apply today. Accordingly, it
is important to understand the foundations of prior law that the ADA was built upon with
special attention to Section 504.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
It should be noted that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was not the result of
intensive lobbying by disability rights advocates, but was actually a broad spending bill
with specific sections that actually copied the antidiscrimination language from the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and applied it to people with disabilities (Shapiro, 1994). Section 504
of the Act provides that:
No otherwise qualified [individual with a disability] …shall, solely by
reason of his [disability], be excluded from the participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance… (29 U.S.C. § 794).

Although Section 504 and the ADA are similar in purpose, one main distinction
between the two laws is that Section 504 only applied to entities and programs that
received federal funding, federal executive agencies, and the United States Postal Service
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2005). Accordingly, because state and local governments
receive federal financial assistance, the public sector has been subject to
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antidiscrimination mandates since the enactment of Section 504 and therefore, has a
tradition of supporting the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability prior to
the enactment of the ADA (Percy, 2001). Thus, Section 504 can be viewed as a less
developed version of disability civil rights law that required further expansion to
adequately protect the rights of individuals with disabilities.
Relevant Litigation Pertaining to Section 504
Litigation under Section 504 has addressed such issues as whether an individual is
otherwise qualified, whether discriminatory action actually occurred, whether reasonable
accommodations were required, and whether undue burden was a defense to a claim
under Section 504. Judicial interpretation of Section 504 is important for understanding
that statute, but also for understanding the ADA because this judicial interpretation was
incorporated into the language of the ADA (Rothstein, 2006).
An early example of judicial interpretation of Section 504 by the United States
Supreme Court is Southeastern Community College v. Davis (1979). In the Davis case,
the Supreme Court held that Section 504 does not require educational institutions to make
substantial modifications to programs to allow individuals with disabilities to participate,
and that the “otherwise qualified” language of the statute requires the individual to meet
academic and physical requirements of the program. Accordingly, a student must be
otherwise qualified to meet the requirements of an academic program. Accommodations
in postsecondary curriculum are not considered to be reasonable if they alter fundamental
or essential requirements. However Alexander v. Choate (1985) held that reasonable
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accommodations may be required to provide meaningful access to a program for an
individual with a disability who is otherwise qualified to participate in the program.
United States Supreme Court Decisions Interpreting the ADA
Disability is a social construct defined by law rather then an immutable
characteristic, and therefore, the legal definition determines coverage (Hensel, 2009).
The United States Supreme Court provided direction for legal analysis of whether a
person is considered to be an individual with a disability within the scope of ADA
coverage. In Bragdon v. Abbott (1998), the Supreme Court set forth a three-step analysis:
1) Does the actual individual condition constitute an impairment? 2) Does the impairment
affect one or more major life activity? 3) Does the individual’s impairment substantially
limit the particular major life activity at issue?
Another critical consideration pertaining to substantial limitation arose a year
after the Bragdon decision. This issue involved whether mitigating measures should be
taken into account when determining if an impairment substantially limits a major life
activity. Three cases from the United States Court of Appeals addressing this issue were
granted review by the Supreme Court and decided simultaneously (Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 1999; Albertson’s Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 1999; and Murphy v. United Parcel
Inc.,1999). The Supreme Court held that mitigating measures must be taken into account
when determining the degree of limitation imposed by an individual’s impairment,
notwithstanding the prior interpretation by both the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) that mitigating measures should
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not be taken into consideration when determining if an individual is substantially limited
in a major life activity.
The lead case that set judicial precedent was Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.
(1999), which held that “…the determination of whether an individual is disabled should
be made with reference to measures that mitigate the individual’s impairment.”
However, this conclusion was seen by lawyers that drafted the ADA statute as being
contrary to the legislative intent of Congress. Three congressional committee reports
specifically stated that mitigating measures should not be taken into account when
determining disability, however, the Supreme Court did not find this legislative history
persuasive (Feldblum, 2000). The Supreme Court further ignored the EEOC regulations
that substantial limitation must be made without consideration of mitigating measures
such as medications or assistive devices (Heekin, 2011). Another view was that the
Sutton ruling was due to a poorly worded statute that was seen as a benefit to plaintiffs
that were never intended to be beneficiaries of the ADA (Selmi, 2008).
The Supreme Court did note in one of the companion cases that was decided
simultaneously with Sutton, Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg (1999), that the burden of
establishing a substantial limitation of a major life activity is not onerous and that certain
limitations will ordinarily qualify as disabilities under the ADA. The Supreme Court
further ruled in Albertson’s under the Sutton precedent that the lower court had erred in
finding that “a mere difference” in “an individual’s manner of performing a major life
activity” was sufficient to establish a substantial limitation to the capacity to perform the
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activity, and there must be a “significant restriction” of the performance of a majority
activity to establish a substantial limitation (National Council on Disability, 2003). The
third case, Murphy, was also decided under the rationale set forth in Sutton in ruling
against the plaintiff.
The Sutton trilogy appeared to preclude ADA coverage when ameliorative
mitigating measures were present. However, a fourth case presenting the same issue,
Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners (1999), was summarily remanded to
the trial court by the Supreme Court to determine whether the plaintiff was covered by
the ADA in light of the Sutton ruling. Therefore, the question presented upon remand
was whether the plaintiff was substantially limited in a major life activity after the
consideration of mitigating measures. The trial court answered in the affirmative that the
plaintiff was substantially limited in the major life activity of reading, notwithstanding
steps she had taken to mitigate her impairment (Rothstein, 2004). Accordingly, the
Bartlett decision confounded the Sutton ruling to a limited extent.
Three years following the Sutton trilogy rulings, the Supreme Court issued
another restrictive decision in Toyota Motor Manufacturing Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams
(2002). The Toyota decision was very significant concerning the legal standard required
to establish disability under the ADA. The court’s ruling resulted in an even more
restrictive interpretation of the term “substantially limits” that transferred the “significant
restriction” language set forth in the Albertson’s case to “prevents or severely restricts”
the performance of a major life activity. The Court further stated that the ADA creates a
demanding standard to establish disability under the law. Additionally, the Toyota ruling
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also imposed a strict interpretation of the term major life activity as activities that are of
central importance to most people’s daily lives (National Council on Disability, 2003).
Following the Toyota ruling, Representative Steny Hoyer, a sponsor of the original ADA,
wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post, entitled “Not Exactly What We Intended, Justice
O’Connor,” criticizing the court’s interpretation of the law (Hoyer, 2002). He chided the
Supreme Court and indicated that Congress would have the final say as to the statutory
interpretation of the ADA. Representative Hoyer later was instrumental in the passage of
the ADAAA in 2008.
One later commentary further noted that individuals with cognitive impairments
were essentially precluded from protection under the ADA following the Supreme
Court’s narrow interpretation of the term substantial limitation in the Toyota ruling
because individuals who were otherwise qualified would be viewed as “too-able” to meet
this narrow legal standard (Catchpole & Miller, 2006). Selmi (2008) noted that the
Supreme Court ignored guidance from the EEOC, and a more “logical” analysis of the
statutory text, to arrive at this more demanding standard to qualify under the law by
requiring an individual to establish substantial limitation of activities of central
importance to most people’s daily lives. The court also ignored the legislative intent of
the ADA in arriving at this restrictive decision (Hoffman, 2012) as the ADA was based
upon Section 504. In litigation under Section 504 the courts accepted the concept of
“universalism” giving the term disability an expansive reading, and mostly considered
anyone alleging discrimination based on disability as an individual with a disability under
the act (Barry, 2010).
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As noted, the original intent of the ADA was to mirror the language and intent of
Section 504, which had not been subject to such strict scrutiny by the Supreme Court.
However, as noted above, that was not the case with the ADA. An overly restrictive
standard for determining who was an individual with a disability protected by the law had
been set by the Supreme Court and that precedent was passed down to the lower federal
courts. This judicial interpretation created a conundrum where an individual was not
disabled enough to invoke the protections of the law and at the same time was too
disabled to enjoy privileges available to nondisabled individuals (Silverstein, 2011;
Katsiyannis & Yell, 2003). In essence, the Supreme Court had ruled that the more an
individual was able to manage an impairment, the less likely that person would be
protected from discrimination based on that condition (Barry, 2013).
Federal Appellate Court Decisions Relevant to Postsecondary Education
Due to these restrictive rulings by the Supreme Court, the nation’s courts
struggled with the threshold question of whether an impairment is substantially limiting
to the degree that it is considered a disability under the ADA (Fram, 2008). Most of the
litigation under the ADA had been in the realm of employment discrimination. However,
the definition of disability under the ADA was noted to be generic and was applied by the
courts in the context of students seeking access to educational programs (Zirkel, 2011).
Subsequent to the Supreme Court’s decision in Toyota, the United States Court of
Appeals addressed the application of the legal analysis of being an individual with a
disability under the ADA in the context of postsecondary education. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed the standard set forth in Toyota in the case of
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Wong v. Regents of the University of California (2005). Mr. Wong was a medical student
who had been academically successful until his third year in medical school, although he
had been identified with a learning disability as early as kindergarten. The trial court had
relied on his past successful academic outcomes in finding that he was not disabled
because he was able to read, learn and work as well as “the average person.” The Ninth
Circuit applied the three-step legal analysis as set forth in Bragdon and found that Mr.
Wong had a mental impairment and that the major life activities of reading, learning and
working were alleged to be substantially limited. Therefore, the dispositive issue was the
third step of the analysis, as to whether Mr. Wong’s impairment substantially limited his
ability to perform the major life activities of reading, learning or working. Relying on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Toyota Motor Manufacturing Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams
(2002), the court interpreted the ADA term “substantially limits” to mean prevents or
severely restricts and ruled that Mr. Wong was not an individual with a disability.
In Singh v. George Washington University School of Medicine and Health
Sciences (2007), the District of Columbia Circuit also applied the restrictive standard
concerning substantial limitation set forth by the Supreme Court in Toyota, finding that
an impairment must prevent or severely restrict an individual from doing activities that
are of central importance to most people’s daily lives. This case, like Wong, involved a
medical school student who had been academically successful prior to taking on the
rigorous curriculum of medical school. In reaching its decision that Ms. Singh was not
an individual with a disability under the ADA, the Court further quoted the Toyota
decision noting that the statutory language of the ADA must “ be interpreted to create a
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demanding standard to qualify as disabled.” The Court entered judgment for the medical
school and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The trial court
once again ruled against Ms. Singh who again appealed the decision. Upon a second
review, the Court of Appeals again ruled against the medical student, but this time agreed
with the trial court that Ms. Singh had failed to establish an impairment that caused her
alleged learning disability, and therefore, the issue of substantial limitation was not even
considered (Singh v. George Washington University School of Medicine and Health
Sciences, 2011).
It should be further noted that prior to the Toyota ruling, the Sixth Circuit also
found no substantial limitation in another ADA case involving another medical student
with a learning disability in Gonzales v. National Board of Medical Examiners (2000).
As did the Ninth Circuit, the court applied the three-step analysis set out in Bragdon. The
first two steps of the analysis indicated that Mr. Gonzales had a psychological
impairment and the major life activities of learning (reading and writing) and working
were implicated. Accordingly, once again the dispositive issue was whether Mr.
Gonzales’ impairment substantially limited his ability to perform these major life
activities as compared to most people in the general population. The court focused on
Mr. Gonzales’ academic success prior to medical school. The court further noted that
under Sutton:
[e]ven if self-accommodations enhanced Plaintiff’s performance to
that of most people, he is not disabled under the ADA. Recently
[1999], the Supreme Court ruled that in determining whether individuals
are disabled under the ADA they should be examined in their corrected
state [citing Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg].
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Based upon this analysis, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s holding that Mr.
Gonzales was not substantially impaired in his ability to perform the major life activities
of reading, writing, and working. However, a dissenting opinion in Gonzales noted that
his “reasonably good performance in high school and his first two years of college does
not foreclose a finding that he has a reading disability,” and referenced the evidence of
record demonstrating how Mr. Gonzales was able to be successful without formal
accommodations despite having a severe reading disability. The dissent further argued
that compensatory strategies developed by an individual with LD are very much different
than corrective self-accommodations referred to by the Supreme Court and should not be
considered when determining disability status. (Gonzales v. National Board of Medical
Examiners, 2000).
Summary of Court Rulings on the ADA
Under the rule of precedent from the Supreme Court, the Federal Court of
Appeals accepted and indeed embraced this strict judicial interpretation of disability
under the ADA. Individuals were now faced with an onerous burden in order to establish
disability under the law. An individual now had to show an inability or severe restriction
in performing a major life activity, and a major life activity had to be an activity that was
of central importance of most people’s daily lives. Additionally, mitigating measures that
individuals used to alleviate the effects of an impairment had to be considered when
determining eligibility under the ADA. The end result was that litigation under the ADA
was often decided on the threshold issue of disability and individuals entitled to
protection were denied coverage by the courts (Blue, 2012). As posited by Hill and
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Blanck (2009), the courts had essentially disregarded an inclusive civil rights model
premised on the notion that barriers to access were not a necessary result of medical
conditions, but rather from societal assumptions and decisions to exclude individuals with
disabilities.
Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008
These decisions from the Supreme Court and lower courts drastically changed the
meaning of the term disability as originally intended, and Congress felt that the law had
been misconstrued and misapplied to individuals with disabilities (Feldblum, Barry, &
Benfer, 2008). In response, the Americans with Disabilities Act Restoration Act was
introduced in Congress on July 26, 2007 (ADARA, 2007). However, it was not until
June 25, 2008 that the House of Representatives passed a revised form of the ADARA,
H. R. 3195, the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA, 2008). On September 11,
2008, the Senate passed S. 3406, a modified version of the ADAAA of 2008. Instead of
being referred to conference committee for reconciliation, S. 3406 was voted on by the
House of Representatives in its entirety and was passed on September 17, 2008. The
legislation was signed into law by President George W. Bush on September 25, 2008, and
went into effect on January 1, 2009. The major provisions of the law provide for:
•

relaxation of the standard to establish a substantial limitation of a major life
activity;

•

the elimination of use of mitigating measures;

•

the expansion of definition of major life activities;

16
•

instruction to the EEOC to revise the regulatory definition of substantial
limitation;

•

expansion of the definition of auxiliary aids and services (Heyward, 2009).

The focus of Congress in enacting the ADAAA was to be inclusive with statutory text
and provide legislative history as a safety net, and blueprint for administrative agencies to
follow later when creating regulations pursuant to the amended law (Barry, 2013).
Significant Changes in the ADA Effectuated by the ADAAA
As noted, prior Supreme Court holdings had narrowed the broad scope of
protection under the ADA intended by Congress, and the application of these judicially
imposed restrictive standards resulted in less than three percent of individuals asserting
claims of discrimination against employers and educational facilities to successfully
prevail on claims of discrimination (Slack, 2009). The ADAAA rejected this demanding
standard in favor of broad coverage of individuals with disabilities (Long, 2008).
However, although Congress recognized the need to relax this overly restrictive standard,
the language of the bill failed to specifically alter the ADA language to reflect this
change (Klein, 2010).
The purposes section of the ADAAA states congressional intent to reinstate a
broad scope of protection under the ADA, and a rejection of the Sutton requirement of
consideration of ameliorative effects of mitigating measures in determining substantial
impairment of a major life activity (Long, 2008). The ADAAA further rejected the
standards enunciated in Toyota that the terms “substantially” and “major” in the
definition of disability under the ADA “need to be interpreted strictly to create a
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demanding standard for qualifying as disabled” and that “an individual must have an
impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are
of central importance to most people’s daily lives.” The question of whether an
individual’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity under the ADA should
not demand extensive analysis (ADAAA Section 2, 2008). Furthermore, the holding in
Toyota that the significant restriction of a major life activity must pertain to activities of
central importance to daily life was also determined to be contrary to the intent of the
original ADA (Feldblum, Barry, & Benfer, 2008).
The Revised Definition of Disability for Determining Eligibility Under the ADAAA
The issue of whether a person has a disability was intended to be a basic threshold
issue. The legislative history of the ADAAA recognizes a much lower threshold for
determining whether a person is an individual with a disability under the law than
enunciated by the Supreme Court (Barry, 2010). The changes brought about by the
ADAAA indicate that the focus should be on whether discrimination has occurred rather
than meeting a strict definition of disability (Elliott, 2012). The ADAAA restored the
original intent that the focus of judicial analysis of the statute should be whether an
individual with a disability, which was intended to be a very broad category, is being
granted equal access through reasonable accommodations (i.e., is not being discriminated
against by the entity subject to the provisions of the ADA; American University
Washington College of Law, 2009). Once this initial standard is established, it is
incumbent on the entity to provide reasonable accommodations and modifications to
ensure access to the individual with a disability. The definition of disability must now be
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construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals to the maximum extent permitted by
the terms of the amended statute (Race & Dornier, 2009). Yet even with this enunciation
of a much more liberal standard, Hickox (2011) stated that Congress may have missed
the mark in not setting forth more clearly how an individual can establish a substantial
limitation of a major life activity under the ADA.
New EEOC Regulations Re: Definition of Disability
As part of the ADAAA, Congress explicitly rejected the then current EEOC
regulation that defined substantially limited as “significantly restricted to the condition,
manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity
as compared to … the average person in the general population” (ADA Regulations, Title
I, 29 C.F.R. §10.2(j), 2010).
The ADAAA further expressly delegated authority to the EEOC to issue
regulations to define the term “substantially limits” as a direct response to the Supreme
Court’s ruling in the Sutton case that questioned the authority of the EEOC to issue such
a specific regulation under the original ADA (Miller, 2011). Final regulations were
published by the EEOC on March 25, 2011, with an effective date of May 24, 2011
(ADAAA Final Regulations, Title I, Federal Register, 2011). Although the EEOC
regulations specifically pertain to employment under Title I of the ADA, courts have
applied provisions of Title I regulations interchangeably with Title II and Title III of the
ADA that are applicable to postsecondary education (McElwee v. County of Orange,
2012).

19
The new EEOC regulations have made it easier for a person seeking protection
under the ADA to establish that he or she is an individual with a disability within the
meaning of the law. An individual no longer is required to establish that a substantially
limiting impairment must severely restrict the performance of a major life activity (Smith
& Cherry, 2012), or even significantly restrict the ability to perform a major life activity
(Stone, 2011). The regulatory language, which parallels the statutory language, provides
that the new standard should not demand an extensive analysis and ensures the provision
of reasonable accommodations to individuals protected under the act (Barry, 2010). The
regulations provide that the focus should be on how a major life activity is substantially
limited and not on the outcomes an individual can achieve (Travis, 2011).
The comparison group for determining substantial limitation was changed from
the “average person” to “most people in the general population” to allow for a more
common sense approach in determining substantial limitation (Drohan, 2011). The
comparison to “most people” usually will not require scientific, medical, or statistical
analysis under the EEOC’s regulatory rules of construction (Silverstein, 2011). However,
it may be helpful to consider the condition, manner, or duration it takes to perform a
specific activity as compared to most people (Simon, 2011). For example, an individual
with dyslexia struggles with the basic mechanics of reading but most people do not have
such discrepancies (Simon, 2002). Accordingly, under a liberal reading of the new
statutory language, the fact that most people do not suffer from dyslexia may be enough
to differentiate such individuals from the general population.
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The key element of the new EEOC regulations for determining disability is the
section that addresses the term “substantially limits” in relation to establishing that a
person is an individual with a disability within the scope of protection of the act. There
are nine enumerated rules of construction when determining whether an impairment
substantially limits a major life activity:
1) substantially limits must be construed broadly in favor of coverage and is not a
demanding standard;
2) the comparison group is most people in the general population, but an impairment
does not have to prevent, or significantly or severely restrict the performance of a
major life activity;
3) determination of substantial limitation should not demand extensive analysis;
4) an individualized assessment is required;
5) comparison to most people in the general population does not require scientific,
medical or statistical evidence, but may be used if appropriate; typically a person
with a learning disability will be substantially limited in learning, reading and
thinking as compared to the general population;
6) determination of substantial limitation must be made without regard to the
ameliorative effects of mitigating measures, except for eyeglasses and contact
lenses;
7) impairments that are episodic or in remission may be substantially limiting;
8) there only needs to be substantial limitation of one major life activity;
9) effects of an impairment that is expected to last fewer than six months may be
substantially limiting (Allbright, 2011 and Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, 2011).
Impact of the ADAAA on Postsecondary Education and Eligibility Documentation
The ADAAA made changes to the three main titles of the ADA, pertaining to
employment, public services, and public accommodations and services operated by
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private entities. Therefore the ADAAA has a significant impact on postsecondary
educational institutions. These amendments, effective as of January 2009, have greatly
relaxed the standard for students with disabilities to qualify for coverage under the ADA.
The legal standard for showing that one is substantially impaired in the performance of a
major life activity is much easier to establish under the amended statute. The lower
threshold standard of establishing disability under the ADAAA will shift the focus to
more complex factual issues such as the provision of reasonable accommodations (Peikes
& Burns, 2009). As early as 2009, the courts were already interpreting this threshold
standard more liberally and requiring a lesser burden of documenting disability (Sampat
& Grant, 2012).
Furthermore, reading, writing, thinking, speaking, concentration, all components
of learning, and learning specifically are all now enumerated major life activities under
the law (ADAAA Section 4(a), 2008), meaning that more students may be covered under
the law and there will be a more specific focus on these enumerated major life activities
(Heekin, 2011). The past jurisprudence under the ADA of being centered on whether an
individual was disabled is likely over and now impairments ranging from depression to
cancer in remission may be seen as disabilities per se under the ADAAA (Terry, 2011).
Accordingly, educational institutions of higher learning must adopt new policies or revise
existing policies concerning requests for accommodations under the ADA, and focus on
an interactive process to provide reasonable accommodations for students with
disabilities (Bowman, 2011).
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Post-ADAAA Focus for Postsecondary Education Institutions
Prior to the ADAAA, the focus for postsecondary education was the actual
determination of whether a student was substantially limited in a major life activity, and
therefore eligible for protection and reasonable accommodations. Now the determination
concerning disability status is a lesser threshold issue. Instead, the focus of the ADAAA
is on discrimination which will most often arise in the context whether a student with a
disability is being provided with reasonable accommodations in order to obtain equal
access (Travis, 2011). This change is likely to impact perspectives of the field on the role
of documentation. The main purpose of documentation before the ADAAA was to
establish that the student was an individual with a disability. Now the main purpose is to
establish the impact of an impairment on functional capacity and the ability of the student
to perform academic related tasks (Shaw, Keenan, Madaus, & Banerjee, 2010).
Additionally, the ADA existing regulations were amended by the DOJ on
September 15, 2010 (ADA Regulations, Title III Amendments, 2010). In particular the
regulation at 28 C.F.R §36.309 addressing examinations and courses related to licensing,
certification, or credentialing for secondary or postsecondary education, professional, or
trade purposes were amended. This amendment provided that 1) documentation must be
reasonable and limited to the need for accommodation, 2) considerable weight must be
given to documentation of past accommodation in testing, and 3) the entity must respond
in a timely manner to requests for accommodations (Sampat and Grant, 2012).
Postsecondary institutions have relied on case law under Section 309 in the past in
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developing documentation policies and therefore, these changes in the regulations will
become more important as case law develops (Simon, 2011).
Potential Focus of the Courts Under the ADAAA
Looking forward, courts may focus on the severity of endogenous limitations and
the right to obtain reasonable accommodations under the ADAAA (Cox, 2010).
Accordingly, postsecondary schools should focus on an individualized assessment of
students to determine disability status and the need for appropriate academic
accommodations based on current functional capacity (Shaw, 2009). Focus on
quantitative psychometric test scores and evaluations, and debate over interpretation of
test scores in terms of defining disability that have permeated disability documentation
may no longer be an advisable practice. For example, in addition to overall standardized
scoring on psychometric testing, substantial limitation may also be documented when test
scores indicate a significant discrepancy between individual intellectual capacity and
actual reading ability (Yingling, 2011). Students continue to bear the burden of
presenting documentation of the need for requested academic accommodations.
However, rejection of documentation presented from a student’s medical or educational
expert must be clearly explained and supported by the opinion of an appropriate expert in
the relevant field (Heyward, 2009).
Because of this expanded definition of disability, courts will now decide more
cases on the merits than on if a person is qualified for protections under the law, and
postsecondary institutions will need to establish that actions, or even failure to take
action, are not a result of discrimination (Slack, 2009). A broader and more liberal
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interpretation of coverage called for under the ADAAA should have a substantial impact
on the relevance of standardized testing results, especially for students that have done
well academically, and therefore were previously found not to meet ADA qualification
standards (Grossman, 2009). The legislative history of the ADAAA clearly indicates that
a student that has done well academically in the past may still be substantially limited in
the major life activities of learning, reading, writing, thinking or speaking (Shackelford,
2009), as noted in the pre-ADAAA decision in Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law
Examiners (2001). In fact the legislative history of the ADAAA indicates Congressional
endorsement of the Bartlett decision, and rejection of the restrictive interpretations set
forth in Wong v. Regents of the University of California (2005) and Gonzales v. National
Board of Medical Examiners (2000; Yingling, 2011). Congress has further indicated that
a student may be gifted and talented, and at the same time require academic
accommodations as an individual with a disability (Simon, 2011). Furthermore, the new
EEOC regulations specifically provide, at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (4)(iii), that an individual
with a learning disability that has achieved a high level of academic success may be
substantially limited in learning due to additional effort required as compared to most
people (ADAAA Final Regulations, Title I, Federal Register, 2011).
Disability Determination Under the ADAAA
Postsecondary schools retain the right to make disability determinations after
consideration of evidence provided by students. Something more than a mere diagnosis
must be provided, however, requesting documentation beyond the minimum to establish
a disability and support a request for reasonable accommodation may be determined to be
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impermissible under the ADAAA (Heyward, 2011). The ADAAA does not change the
duty to provide reasonable accommodations, yet medical verification of a disabling
impairment may play an enhanced role in determining reasonable accommodations by
showing the impact of an impairment (Jones, 2010). However, eligibility under the ADA
is now a much more relaxed threshold requirement, and therefore, students are much
more likely to establish disability status under the ADA, thereby switching the focus to
more complex issues regarding the provision of reasonable accommodations (Bowman,
2011). The Association on Higher Education And Disability (AHEAD) has provided an
updated conceptual framework pertaining to postsecondary education documentation
policy for supporting requests for academic accommodations (AHEAD, 2012). In
congruence with the ADAAA, this guidance focuses on determining effective reasonable
accommodations as opposed to establishing that a student is considered to be an
individual with a disability under the law.
Right to Make Determinations and Preservation of Academic Integrity
Postsecondary institutions may be concerned that the relaxed legal standard for
qualification under the ADAAA will open the “floodgates” and that students with
disabilities utilizing mitigating measures may be able to function with minimal
impairment (Joiner, 2010). Congress has provided less guidance concerning the
determination of reasonable accommodations than in making the initial determination
that an individual has a disability that is within the scope of coverage under the ADA
(Bissonette, 2009). However, postsecondary institutions have taken a broad view of
disability and the provision of academic accommodations even beyond the scope of prior
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ADA requirements (Lerner, 2004). Therefore, the impact of an expanded definition of
substantial limitation under the ADAAA may be limited as to increasing the number of
students actually receiving ADA accommodations (Hensel, 2009).
Colleges and universities retain the right to make accommodation decisions as
before the enactment of the ADAAA, although it should be noted that the process of
making such determinations has varied considerably across institutions of higher
education (Lindstrom, 2007). Additionally, the language of the ADAAA reinforces the
longstanding ADA provision that postsecondary institutions are not required to provide
academic accommodations that would fundamentally alter essential academic
requirements (ADAAA Section 6(a)(1)(f), 2009; American University Washington
College of Law, 2009). Nevertheless, it is incumbent on the postsecondary institution to
provide reasonable accommodations to all students with disabilities through a process
that is fair and equitable and to determine the true requirements that meet appropriate
academic standards (Race & Dornier, 2009). Accordingly, the determination that a
specific academic accommodation fundamentally alters an essential academic
requirement must be made through a valid deliberative process (Wynne v. Tufts
University School of Medicine, 1992; Guckenberger v. Boston University, 1998). Courts
are not likely to override academic policy unless there is substantial departure from
academic norms that indicate a failure to exercise professional judgment (Zukle v.
Regents of the University of California, 1999; Regents of the University of Michigan v.
Ewing, 1985).
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A postsecondary institution may also show that providing the requested
accommodation imposes an undue hardship and therefore, is not required under the ADA.
For example, in Powell v. National Board of Medical Examiners (2004), the court found
that a medical school student’s requested accommodation of waiving a passing grade on
the United States Medical Licensing Examination was unreasonable and imposed an
undue hardship on the medical school. These protections still insulate postsecondary
institutions from having to provide requested academic accommodations that would
otherwise be viewed as reasonable under the ADA, but for the fact that they would
fundamentally alter an essential academic requirement or impose an undue hardship.
Summary
Review of the literature concerning the ADA indicates that the original intent of
this federal legislation was to protect the civil rights of individuals with disabilities from
discrimination. However, the Supreme Court issued rulings that severely limited the
standing of a plaintiff to show substantial limitation of a major life activity. Specifically,
the court ruled that mitigating measures must be considered, a major life activity must be
one that is of central importance to most people’s lives, and that substantial limitation is a
strict standard requiring a showing that an impairment prevents or severely limits the
ability to perform a major life activity. The result was that many individuals were found
not to be substantially limited in a major life activity and were not protected by the ADA.
The ADAAA was enacted by Congress to rectify the improper standards imposed
by the Supreme Court, and to restore the original intent of the ADA. Substantial
limitation of a major life activity was restated as a threshold standard that did not demand
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extensive analysis, not requiring severe or even significant restriction by an impairment.
The EEOC was ordered by Congress to amend its regulations that defined substantial
limitation as a significant restriction. The definition of major life activities was expanded
and a non-exhaustive list of major life activities was enumerated.
The impact of the changes enacted through the ADAAA is still unfolding. It is
now easier to establish substantial limitation of a major life activity. Accordingly, more
postsecondary students will be eligible for protection from discrimination under the
ADA. Students will have a lesser burden in presenting documentation to establish
eligibility. Students that have demonstrated academic success in the past may still be
eligible for postsecondary academic accommodations. Postsecondary institutions are not
required to fundamentally alter essential academic requirements, or provide
accommodations that create an undue burden or hardship. Accordingly, postsecondary
institutions do not have to provide accommodations that alter essential academic
requirements, and will be given deference by the courts in determining these academic
requirements.
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Abstract
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) was enacted as civil rights
legislation to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities. The intent of
Congress was to provide broad coverage and that the threshold eligibility requirement of
being substantially limited in a major life activity would not require extensive legal
analysis. However, the legal precedent set by the Supreme Court resulted in lower
federal courts denying many people coverage under the ADA. Specifically, students in
postsecondary education with documented learning disabilities were denied coverage
because they had exhibited high academic achievement. The Americans with Disabilities
Act Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) was a direct response by Congress to overrule
the Supreme Court, and restore the original intent of broad coverage of individuals with
disabilities. The purpose of this study is to expand research on the current legal standard
of disability under the ADA as amended by the ADAAA through legal research methods
analyzing statutory and regulatory language, legislative history, and relevant case law.
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Analysis of the Legal Standard of Disability Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008
Introduction and Statement of the Problem
Congress provided protection against discrimination for individuals with
disabilities through the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990 and intended for
this to be a broad scope of protection (Long, 2008; 42 U.S.C. §12101(b)). However, a
series of restrictive judicial rulings from the United States Supreme Court (Supreme
Court) and various lower federal courts that followed the Supreme Court precedent
abrogated this intent (Feldblum, Barry, and Benfer, 2008). These judicial rulings created
restrictive legal standards concerning the definition of disability as a substantial
limitation of a major life activity. The Supreme Court required that an impairment must
prevent or severely restrict the performance of a major life activity that is of central
importance to most people’s daily lives. (Toyota Motor Manufacturing Kentucky v.
Williams, 2002), and that the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures must be
considered in determining whether there is a substantial limitation of a major life activity
(Sutton v. United Air Lines, 1999; Murphy v. United Parcel Inc., 1999; Albertson’s Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 1999).
Contrary to the original intent of Congress, the Supreme Court issued the four
referenced judicial rulings that set a very restrictive legal standard to establish the basic
threshold of eligibility under the ADA. In response, Congress passed the American with
Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) that became effective on January 1,
2009. The main purpose of this legislation was to restore the original intention of
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Congress in enacting the ADA, and to negate the restrictive legal standards imposed by
the Supreme Court.
Although the Supreme Court decisions focused on eligibility in the context of
employment, the ADAAA has significant impact on the focus of eligibility determination
for postsecondary education institutions and students with disabilities. In the case of
postsecondary education, the law requires the provision of academic accommodations to
qualified students with disabilities to enable them to access educational programs. In this
context, the crux of antidiscrimination protection under the law is to provide these
necessary accommodations to ensure a student is not being denied the benefit of equal
participation in the postsecondary education program (Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §
12132 and Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)).
The lower federal courts issued subsequent rulings denying postsecondary
students with disabilities the protection of the ADA noting that the students failed to
establish disability under the restrictive standards set forth in the Toyota and Sutton.
Under this restrictive standard, postsecondary students who were academically successful
encountered difficulty in establishing a substantial limitation of a major life activity to
qualify for legal protection under the ADA.
The current issue for postsecondary education students and institutions is
determining the legal standard for eligibility under the ADA following the enactment of
the ADAAA. Congress enacted the ADAAA to overrule the restrictive eligibility
standard set forth by the Supreme Court. Was this goal accomplished and to what extent?
Accordingly, legal analysis of the current standard is necessary to determine if the
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ADAAA has remedied the past problem and what is the new legal standard that has
replaced the prior interpretation of the Supreme Court.
Method
The method utilized in the study is analysis through legal research. Legal
research is the process that lawyers, jurists, and legal scholars use to find authority to
support and define a principle of law. Primary authorities are sources of law that are
binding on courts, government and individuals. These sources include statutes,
administrative regulations, court decisions and court orders (Cornell University Law
School – Legal Information Institute, 2013a). A brief description of each source follows.
Federal Statutes
The ADA and ADAAA are federal statutes. The official federal statutes are
codified first in the Statutes at Large and then in the United States Code (USC), and also
are available with further annotations and relevant case law citations in the United States
Code Annotated (USCA) and United States Code Service (USCS). Analysis of the
meaning of the subject statutes is first done through a close reading of the statutory
language to ascertain the intent of Congress in enacting these antidiscrimination laws,
and further determine the substantive principles of law codified in the statutes.
Statutory construction. The process of determining the meaning of a particular
statute is referred to as statutory construction. Statutory interpretation begins with a
reading of the plain language of the subject statute, and application of the usual and
ordinary meaning to determine original intent. There are basic or general rules of
statutory construction. One section of statutes is read to be consistent with all other
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sections of the statute. A limitation in an earlier version of the statute that is deleted prior
to enactment presumes the limitation was not intended. Congress is presumed to act
intentionally when language is included in one section of a statute but omitted in another.
Conflict between case law and legislation is usually reconciled in favor of the legislation.
Courts may look to the common usage of a word, prior case law, dictionaries, parallel
meaning, and punctuation to determine the meaning of a statute (Cornell University Law
School – Legal Information Institute, 2013b).
However, there are conflicting schools of thought concerning the application of
statutory construction. There is the position of “purposivism” which is interpretation by
discerning the underlying purpose of Congress in enacting a statute. Contrary to
purposivism, the principle of “new textualism” advocates that the meaning of the plain
text, and not the intent of Congress, determines the meaning of a statute (Walker, 2002).
The plain meaning rule that disallows reliance on legislative history to determine the
meaning of a statute was often more honored in the breach than the observance with
courts finding the language to be ambiguous indicating the need to consider the
legislative history (Kim, 2008). Regardless of the emphasis placed upon statutory
construction, the analysis of the intent of Congress in the context of comprehensive legal
research includes analysis of the legislative history of a statute.
Given that the subsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute is
entitled to great weight in terms of statutory construction (Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 1969), this especially holds true with the statutory sources of law that are the focus
of the present subject research, the ADA and the ADAAA. Legislative history to
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determine the intent of a legislature is appropriately used to interpret statutory text where
the meaning cannot be conclusively determined from the text alone (Funk, 1997).
Legislative history. Federal legislative history consists of all the related
documents created by Congress that precede the enactment of a public law (McKinney &
Sweet, 2008). Legislative history includes congressional committee reports and recorded
commentary from the floor of the House of Representatives and Senate that often
becomes valuable when disputes arise from ambiguous statutory language. As noted,
some courts disapprove of using legislative history to clarify the meaning of a law,
however the volume of federal legislation has resulted in an increasing reliance on
legislative history in the federal court system (Duke University School of Law, 2012).
Legislative history can be instructive in determining the intent of Congress when
legislation is drafted and enacted. However, authority given to legislative history will
vary depending on the specific court interpreting a statute. Statutory language that is
plain and unambiguous will be attributed the plain meaning of the language, and
legislative history will be given limited weight as a general rule of law utilized by courts
in interpreting statutes (Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 2002).
Usually, the reports of the congressional committees that review proposed
legislation and recommend enactment are considered the most authoritative source for
determining the intent of Congress in enacting a law. Other documents that comprise the
legislative history include statements made on the floor of Congress in legislative debate,
testimony at committee hearings, and earlier or alternative versions of the bill that is
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passed (Duke University Law School, 2012). The reports of congressional committees
include reports from the House of Representatives and the Senate.
Administrative Agency Regulations
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Department of
Justice (DOJ) also formally promulgated administrative regulations related to the ADA
and the ADAAA pursuant to specific delegation of rulemaking authority in the statutes.
Substantive agency rules or regulations, referred to as legislative rules, are promulgated
by the respective administrative agencies pursuant to the federal Administrative
Procedures Act (2011) at 5 U.S.C. §553, and have the force and effect of law (Funk,
2002). The terms rule and regulation are generally considered synonymous; see 2 U.S.C
§658(10) defining rule and regulation as meaning the same.
Agency regulations are initially published in the Federal Register pursuant to the
Federal Register Act (2011) at 44 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1511. Both proposed and final
regulations are published as part of the promulgation process. A period for public
comment is provided following the issuance of a proposed regulation. Pursuant to
administrative regulation, all comments to proposed rules and agency responses are
summarized in the preamble before a final regulation is published, and all proposed and
final regulations must be submitted with specific preamble heading material (Federal
Register Act Regulations, 1976). This supplementary information often provides the
background and need for the regulation, and how a final rule differs from a proposed rule
when changes have been made (McKinney, 2012). Administrative agency regulations
are codified in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) after being published in the
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Federal Register. In addition to the regulations, the Code of Federal Regulations
contains references to the statutory authority supporting the regulation and references to
related publications in the Federal Register.
Judicial Case Law
The history of jurisprudence in the United States is based upon the English
common law system. Over time, the common law system has been supplanted by
statutory law created by Congress and federal administrative agencies. Judicial decisions
are an important primary source of law because it is the courts that interpret the disputed
meaning of specific statutes and regulations. Decisions of higher authority appellate
courts set legal precedence and may be binding on lower courts under the legal doctrine
of stare decisis, or at least persuasive concerning rules of law. Accordingly, the federal
courts must interpret statutes and regulations and are bound by authoritative rulings by
higher courts. In the hierarchy of authority in the federal court system the Supreme Court
is the highest authority and final arbiter involving disputes concerning the constitution
and federal statutes. The Court of Appeals is the intermediate federal appellate court,
while the District Court is the trial level of adjudication in the federal system.
In researching case law to determine a specific rule of law it is necessary to make
certain the judicial decision that is being relied upon is still “good law.” This process
will show if a prior ruling has been overruled and even more importantly, when the ruling
has been followed by other courts. Accordingly, research of subsequent case law is
necessary.
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Findings
The findings derived from the research include: 1) Legal standard of disability
under the ADA prior to the enactment of the ADAAA; 2) Legislative history showing
Congressional intent in enacting the ADAAA; 3) Specific statutory language from the
ADAAA; 4) Changes in administrative agency regulations required by the ADAAA; and
5) Judicial decisions interpreting the ADAAA and amended regulations.
Legal Standard of Disability Under the ADA of 1990
The Supreme Court issued four decisions interpreting the ADA definition of
disability and defining the legal standard of substantial limitation of a major life activity.
These decisions narrowed the original intent of Congress that the standard of establishing
disability under the ADA be broad and inclusive ( Keenan & Shaw, 2011). The first
three decisions were Sutton v. United Air Lines (1999), and its companion cases Murphy
v. United Parcel Inc. (1999); and Albertson’s Inc. v. Kirkingburg (1999). Sutton is the
main case of this trilogy that set forth the precedent narrowing the scope of coverage
under the ADA by requiring consideration of mitigating measures in determining
eligibility. The court’s decision in the Murphy case applied the ruling in Sutton finding
that medication corrected high blood pressure to the point it was no longer substantially
limiting a major life activity. The Albertson’s case further defined mitigating measures to
include self-compensatory measures of adaptation through body systems. In this case
one eye compensating for a visual deficit in the other eye.
The Supreme Court further restricted eligibility in Toyota Motor Manufacturing
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams (2002). This decision further narrowed the scope of the ADA
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in holding that to be substantially limited in a major life activity an individual has to be
prevented or severely restricted from performing tasks that are of central importance to
most people’s daily lives. Substantially limits was defined as considerable or to a large
degree, and major was defined as important with major life activities as activities of
central importance to daily life. The court found these terms that establish disability, and
therefore eligibility, require strict interpretation to meet the legal standard of the law.
Impact on postsecondary education. The precedent set forth by Supreme Court
was followed by the lower federal courts. Challenges pertaining to postsecondary
education students seeking academic accommodations were denied coverage as not
meeting the legal standard of disability. A case involving a medical student with a
learning disability focused on academic success prior to medical. The court relied on the
ruling in Sutton concerning mitigating measures in finding he was not substantially
limited in his ability to perform the major life activities of reading and writing, and
therefore, not eligible under the ADA (Gonzales v. National Board of Medical
Examiners, 2000).
The standard set forth in Toyota was followed in the case of Wong v. Regents of
the University of California (2005) involving another medical student who had been
academically successful until his third year in medical school The determinative issue
was whether his impairment substantially limited the ability to perform the major life
activities of reading, learning or working. Relying on the decision in Toyota the court
interpreted the term “substantially limits” to mean prevents or severely restricts and ruled
against the medical student.
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In Singh v. George Washington University School of Medicine and Health
Sciences (2007), the court again applied the restrictive standard from Toyota, finding that
an impairment must prevent or severely restrict an individual from doing activities that
are of central importance to most people’s daily lives. This case also involved a medical
school student who had been academically successful prior to taking on the rigorous
curriculum of medical school. The Court further quoted the Toyota decision noting that
the statutory language of the ADA must “ be interpreted to create a demanding standard
to qualify as disabled.”
Legislative History of the ADAAA Indicative of Congressional Intent
Congress passed the ADAAA in response to the restrictive standards set forth by
the Supreme Court. The proposed legislation went through both houses of Congress
before it was voted on and enacted as law. In the House of Representatives the ADAAA
was H. R. 3195 and was considered by the Committee on Education & Labor and the
Committee on the Judiciary. On June 23, 2008, the committees issued formal reports on
the proposed legislation (House of Representatives Report 110-730 – Part 1 [Committee
on Education and Labor] and Part 2 [Committee on the Judiciary], 2008). The ADAAA
was later passed by Congress as the Senate form of the legislation, S. 3406, following
reconciliation of the bills between the House and the Senate. The Statement of the
Managers to Accompany S. 3406 was published in the Congressional Record on
September 11, 2008. These reports provide written expression of the legislative intent
and purpose of Congress in enacting the ADAAA. Table 1 provides a summary of the
legislative history of the ADAAA provided by these reports from Congress.
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[Insert Table 1]
Statutory Language of the ADAAA
Following the legislative process noted above, Congress passed the ADAAA.
This remedial legislation was enacted as Public Law 110-325 and initially recorded in the
federal Statutes at Large with specific language later codified in the United States Code.
The ADAAA contains two sections that define the definition of disability and expand
coverage under the ADA: Section 2. Findings And Purposes, and Section 4. Disability
Defined And Rules Of Construction. Table 2 provides a summary of the major
provisions of the ADAAA that affect the determination of disability and eligibility for
coverage under the ADA.
[Insert Table 2]
Amended Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Regulations
As part of the ADAAA, Congress rejected the EEOC regulations that defined
substantially limited as “significantly restricted” in the performance of a major life
activity and directed the EEOC to promulgate new regulations consistent with the
ADAAA definition of disability. The EEOC published the new regulations in the
Federal Register on March 25, 2011. Table 3 provides a summary of the provisions of
the EEOC regulations that pertain to the definition of disability and determination of
substantial limitation of a major life activity. The regulations provide that an impairment
is compared to most people in the general population but this determination does not
usually require scientific, medical or statistical evidence. The determination should take
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into account the condition, manner, or duration to perform a major life activity by the
individual as compared to most people in the general population.
[Insert Table 3]
Judicial Case Law Following Enactment of the ADAAA
As noted previously, decisions of appellate courts set legal precedence and may
be binding on trial courts. In the case of the ADAAA, there have not been any decisions
from the Supreme Court to date, however, there have been decisions issued from the
Court of Appeals. These appellate decisions are not numerous because it takes years for
cases to progress from trail court litigation through appellate adjudication, and the
ADAAA has only been in effect since January 1, 2009. There are also trial court
decisions from the federal District Court that have interpreted the ADAAA. These
decisions do not set legal precedence per se but are relevant to the development of case
law concerning the ADAAA. Accordingly, this section includes trial court decisions on
the ADAAA that pertain to postsecondary education.
Appellate case law interpreting the ADAAA legal standards. The following
are cases that applied the amended standards from the ADAAA:
Brown v. City of Jacksonville (2013). The plaintiff was terminated by her
employer on June 9, 2009 after the implementation of the ADAAA. The court noted that
the trial court had applied the prior EEOC regulation as defining substantially limited as
significantly restricts that had been expressly rejected by Congress in the ADAAA. The
appellate court evaluated the plaintiff’s disability under the “more generous postamendment version of the ADA” and assumed she was a qualified individual with a
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disability, although no formal finding was made on this issue (Brown v. City of
Jacksonville, 711 F. 3d 883, 889).
Jenkins v. National Board of Medical Examiners (2009). The plaintiff was a
third year medical student seeking an academic accommodation of additional time to take
the United States Medical Licensing Examination as a student with a learning disability.
The trial court held that he was not an individual with a disability under the ADA
applying the restrictive standard set forth in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc.
v. Williams, (2002). The Court of Appeals found that the claim involved prospective
relief and therefore, the new legal standards set forth in the ADAAA applied. The court
specifically noted the broad protection under the ADAAA and the directive that courts
interpret the ADA in a more inclusive manner concerning the threshold standard of
coverage Jenkins v. National Board of Medical Examiners 2009 FED App. 0117N, *7-9 .
McElwee v. County of Orange (2012). The plaintiff was diagnosed with Pervasive
Developmental Disorder, which is part of the Autism spectrum. He was dismissed from his
volunteer position at a nursing home and alleged he was discriminated against because of
his disability. Although the relevant events in this matter took place after January 1, 2009,
the trial court did not apply the standards set forth in the ADAAA, and the case was
dismissed. The Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal on other grounds and did not
determine if the trial court had erred in the determining the plaintiff was not substantially
limited in a major life activity. However, the court noted that the amended EEOC
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regulations provide that Autism presents an impairment that is virtually substantially
limiting in all cases; citing 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j)(3)(iii).
The plaintiff’s behavior at the nursing home was found to be inappropriate.
Therefore, the court reasoned that the plaintiff was not a qualified individual without
accommodation, and that his requested accommodations were not reasonable. His first
accommodation request provided no assurance that it would enable him to meet essential
requirements of the volunteer program. The second request was found by the court to be
unreasonable as a matter of law because it merely required people at the nursing home to be
more tolerant of his inappropriate behavior. Accordingly, the dismissal was upheld on
appeal.
Rohr v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District (2009).
In this case an employee was impaired by type 2 insulin dependent diabetes. His
condition was found to potentially impose a substantial limitation of the major life
activity of eating due to the need to strictly monitor and manage his dietary intake. The
court in Rohr did not apply the ADAAA but did discuss the new legal standards to
provide for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities and
provide broad coverage under the ADA. The court noted the broad construction of the
ADA mandated by Congress and the negation of the Supreme Court’s strict standards for
coverage. Substantially limits does not mean, prevents, severely restricts, or significantly
restricts, and impairments must be assessed in an unmitigated state Rohr v. Salt River
Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, 555 F. 3d 850, 861-62 (citations
omitted).
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Allen v. Southcrest Hospital (2011). The plaintiff alleged discrimination for
termination of her employment due to a disability. The court provided analysis of
substantial limitation of the major life activities of caring for oneself and working. In
terms of caring for oneself the court found: “Thus, taken as a whole, the evidence showed
that Ms. Allen's migraines, when active and treated with medication, did not permit her to
perform activities to care for herself in the evenings and compelled her to go to sleep
instead” (Allen v. Southcrest Hospital, 455 Fed. App’x 827, 832). However, the court
further found that the plaintiff had merely made a conclusory showing, not supported by
evidence, and had not established that she was substantially limited as compared to an
average person in the general population.
The court also found that she was not substantially limited in the major life
activity of working. In doing so, the court acknowledged that the ADAAA was in effect
during the relevant events pertaining to the litigation, but also noted that the EEOC
regulations had not been amended until after such time, and therefore applied regulatory
language that had been deleted in the revised regulations. (Allen v. Southcrest Hospital,
455 Fed. App’x 827, 834-35).
ADAAA trial court case law relevant to postsecondary education. The
following cases provide judicial interpretation of the legal standards from the ADAAA
that are relevant to postsecondary education:
Peters v. University of Cincinnati College of Medicine (2012). The plaintiff in
this case was a medical student who was dismissed from the program due to deficient
academic progress. Peters was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) and a
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Non-verbal Learning Disorder (NVLD). During the third year of medical school she
failed a pediatrics exam and was dismissed from the program. Peters alleged
discrimination on the basis of disability for refusing to allow her to retake the failed exam
and dismissal from medical school (Peters v. University of Cincinnati College of
Medicine, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126426, at *1-*7). The court found that Peters was
disabled under the ADA as being substantially limited by her ADD in the major life
activity of learning. The court applied the revised standards of disability under the
ADAAA and the EEOC regulations, noting that the threshold issue of whether an
impairment substantially limits a major life activity should not demand extensive analysis
(Id., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126426, at *13-*18).
In reaching this conclusion the court noted that ADD affects learning so that
someone with ADD cannot perform at a level that might otherwise be expected, and that
it causes problems with focus, attention, organization and inhibitory control. Peters
struggled more than the average person with organizing her thoughts and registering and
retaining new information. The court further noted that the fact that Peters graduated
from college with a dual major and was able to succeed in part of medical school did not
negate this finding. Rather it indicated she was able to achieve some measure of success
despite her disability and does not speak to her learning disability as compared to the
average person. The court stated: the “Defendant’s rationale-that anyone who has had
some modicum of academic success cannot be found to have a disability that affects
learning-flies in the face of Congress’ directives and the relevant implementing
regulations” (Id., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126426, at *18-*20).
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The defendant further argued that allowing Peters to retake the failed exam would
be a fundamental alteration of curriculum. However, the court found that the Dean of the
College of Medicine had not introduced evidence to show he “…even considered the
issue of whether granting her request for accommodation would alter-let alone
fundamentally later-the program or its standards.” The evidence did not establish that the
Dean’s decision should be given deference, and that the discretion to make academic
judgments cannot be used to mask discrimination. Consequently, failure to provide
reasonable accommodations may constitute disability discrimination (Id., 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 126426, at *21-*24).
Alexiadis v. New York College of Health Professionals (2012). In this case a
student was diagnosed with HIV. After disclosing his condition he was dismissed by the
college. He filed suit alleging discrimination on the basis of his disability. The court
noted that the mandate of the ADA was to eliminate discrimination on the basis of
disability, and that the ADAAA expanded the class of individuals entitled to protection
citing the Rohr case. The court further noted that HIV may substantially limit the bodily
function of the immune system, which was included in the ADAAA as a major life
activity (Alexiadis v. New York College of Health Professionals, 891 F. Supp. 2d 418,
427-28). The court went on to state that the revised EEOC regulations at 29 C.F.R.
§1630.2 specifically provide that a factfinder should easily conclude that HIV
substantially limits the major life activity of the function of the immune system. Alexiadis
v. New York College of Health Professionals, 891 F. Supp. 2d 418, 429-30.
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Doe v. Samuel Merritt University (2013). The plaintiff was a student in podiatry
medicine program and had failed Part 1 of the American Podiatric Medical Licensing
Examinations (APMLE) three times. She requested unlimited attempts to retake the
exam. The school had a rule that three sittings was the maximum allowed and the
plaintiff was dismissed from the program. Doe was noted to be diagnosed with an
anxiety disorder, and a panic disorder with agoraphobia, although the court referred to
her impairment as ADD. The defendant did not dispute that Doe had an impairment and
therefore, the dispositive question was whether her impairment presented a substantial
limitation of a major life activity (Doe v. Samuel Merritt University, 921 F. Supp. 2d 95862, 966).
The court provided a thorough discussion of the new legal standards under the
ADAAA. Guidance from the new statutory rules of construction were noted as well as
the revised EEOC regulations. The court stated that the term substantially limits is not a
demanding standard and must be construed in favor of expansive coverage. The term
major, in major life activity, should not be interpreted strictly to create a demanding
standard and not in reference to activities of central importance to daily life (Id. 921 F.
Supp. 2d 958, 965-66; citing 29 C.F.R. §§16630.2(j)(1)(i), (iii) & 16630.2(i)(2)).
The court noted that Bartlett v. N.Y. State Board of Law Examiners, (1997) had
held test-taking is a major life activity under the ADA. The defendant argued that testtaking is not a major life activity. However, the court found that Doe had raised serious
questions as to whether test-taking is a major life activity relying on Bartlett, the
directives of the ADAAA, and the importance of test-taking in society. The defendant
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further argued that only this particular test and not test-taking in general was being
challenged. However, the court found that although Doe required a different
accommodation than was needed for other tests, her limitations affected the general
ability to take tests (Id.,, 921 F. Supp. 2d 958, 967).
The defendant further argued that granting this accommodation would create a
fundamental alteration of the school’s academic program by lowering standards. The
court responded that the “three strikes” rule did not necessarily heighten academic
standards, and found that the school had failed to explore the nature of the student’s
disability and alternatives for other accommodations. The court found that the evidence
indicated there were “serious questions” whether the defendant’s basis to deny the
requested accommodation, and whether “unlimited” testing opportunities is a reasonable
accommodation. The court then ordered the defendant to reinstate Doe on inactive
student status so that she would be eligible to retake the podiatry exam while the
litigation was pending (Id., 921 F. Supp. 2d 958, 970-72).
Brodsky v. New England School of Law (2009). This case involved a law
student seeking readmission after being dismissed for failing two courses. Brodsky was
diagnosed with memory and organizational deficits by neuropsychological examination.
Although the events in this case were before January 1, 2009, the court applied the
standards in the ADAAA due to the potential of prospective injunctive relief was at issue,
and further noted that her allegations met the pre-ADAAA standards. Brodsky asserted
that her difficulty in law school was due to her impairment of poor executive functioning
and memory abilities, and therefore had alleged a substantial impairment of the major life
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activity of learning. However, the court noted that it would be difficult to prove the
impact of her disability at trial because she had failed two courses yet had passed her
other courses (Brodsky v. New England School of Law, 617 F. Supp. 1-8).
Rumbin v. Association of American Medical Colleges (2011). This case
involved a denial of a request for testing accommodations on the Medical College
Admission Test (MCAT). Rumbin was diagnosed with a visual deficit impairment. The
underlying condition was first noted to be “glaucoma, ocular misalignment.” However,
at trial his treating opthamologist clarified that the impairing condition was “convergence
insufficiency” causing difficulty with seeing and reading (Rumbin v. Association of
American Medical Colleges, 803 F. Supp. 2d 83, 85-86).
The court noted the defendant conceded that Rumbin had a visual impairment and
that seeing, reading, and learning are major life activities under the ADAAA.
Accordingly, the dispositive issue was whether his impairments substantially limited him
in any of these major life activities. The court noted that an impairment must be
substantially limiting and not just affect a major life activity citing pre-ADAAA cases
including Sutton. The focus of analysis was then on the issue of comparison group of
“most people” with reference to a pre-ADAAA Department of Justice regulation, as
opposed to the EEOC regulation that implemented the ADAAA (Id., 803 F. Supp. 2d 83,
93).
The court further cited the Wong case that had been rejected by Congress in
legislative history of the ADAAA, that Rumbin must show he is substantially limited in a
major life activity for purposes of daily living as compared to most people. However, the
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ADAAA had clarified that a major life activity does not have to be of central importance
to the daily lives of most people. The court found that Rumbin was not substantially
limited in his ability to see, learn, and read as compared to the general population, and
therefore was not an individual with a disability. In reaching this conclusion, the court
relied upon interpretation from the Albertson’s and Gonzales cases that had been rejected
by Congress without explaining why this was still good law following enactment of the
ADAAA. The court also rejected the clinical opinion of Rumbin’s treating physician and
evaluation of a behavioral optometrist, and accepted the opinion of the defendant’s
consultant who did not examine him. The decision also referred to the Bartlett case
involving a reading disability that found a substantial limitation in reading based on
clinical judgment of evaluating psychologists, but found it to be inapposite because
Rumbin’s opthamologist had not conducted similar testing. Rumbin’s claim was further
rejected by the court because he had a prior history of “education and test-taking without
accommodations.” Id., 803 F. Supp. 2d 83, 93-95.
Healy v. National Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners (2012). This case
involved a request for accommodations on the COMPLEX-USA Level 1 examination
administered by the National Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners (NBOME).
Healy was first diagnosed with a reading disorder and anxiety disorder in college in 2002.
He was granted academic accommodations of extended time and a separate quiet room
for taking tests upon the recommendation of the evaluating psychologist. After college
he sat for the Medical College Admission Test (MCAT) and was granted the same
accommodations in 2005, and again upon reevaluation by the same psychologist in 2006.
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Healy was treated by a psychiatrist for anxiety prior to attending medical school and was
further diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). At medical
school his accommodations of extended time and a quiet testing room were continued.
However, upon requesting the same accommodations for the NBOME examination Healy
was denied after his documentation was reviewed by two NBOME consulting
psychologists (Id., 870 F. Supp 2d 607, 611-16).
The Rumbin case was cited in support of the court’s conclusion that Healy’s
reading impairment did not substantially limit the major life activities of reading,
learning, thinking, and concentrating as “compared to the general population.” The court
further noted the ADA provides that professional licensing or certification examinations
must be provided “in a place and manner accessible to persons with disabilities or offer
alternative arrangements for such individuals” (42 U.S.C. §12189. Healy v. National
Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners, 870 F. Supp 2d 607).
The court referenced provisions of the ADAAA and the revised EEOC
regulations in its analysis of the applicable law, as well as the prior Supreme Court
interpretation and EEOC regulations that were superseded by the ADAAA. The court
found that Healy had a reading disorder, but did not exhibit anxiety or ADHD that would
be considered impairments under the ADA. The major life activities of learning, reading,
thinking, and concentrating were noted to be affected by his impairment. Accordingly,
the court framed the dispositive issue as: “Whether a person is substantially limited in a
major life activity [as] measured by comparison to most people in the general population”
without reference to any statutory or regulatory authority. However, the court did cite the
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pre-ADAAA Price and Gonzales cases that were rejected by Congress in the legislative
history of the ADAAA (Id., 870 F. Supp 2d 607, 616-20).
The court determined that Healy had a relative weakness from his reading
disability but was still in the low average range as assessed by his psychologist, and that
by definition “average” is not substantially limited. The court further concluded that a
“clinical disability” based upon an “internal referrant” is not a “disability under the
ADA” which must be based on an “external referrant…that is, the general population.”
The court continued that an absence of limitation was demonstrated by high academic
achievement in middle school and high school without accommodations, although he
may have self-accommodated at that time. The court further stated that selfaccommodation mechanisms may permit an individual with a disability to achieve
academic success as did the plaintiff in the Bartlett case. However, the court found that
Healy did not present sufficient evidence of self-accommodation and the “scant”
evidence presented did not pertain to his reading disorder, failing to note the
accommodations that had been provided throughout college and medical school. Thus,
Healy was found not to be an individual with a disability under the ADA (Id., 870 F.
Supp 2d 607, 620-22).
Rawdin v. The American Board of Pediatrics (2013). This case also involves
medical professional licensing testing. In 1987, the plaintiff had surgery, chemotherapy
and radiation therapy for treatment of a brain tumor. In 1995 the tumor returned
requiring further surgery and treatment. Rawdin was evaluated by a neuropsychologist in
1996 and again in 2007 with findings of a cognitive impairment impacting his memory
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retrieval system. The memory deficit improved with verbal cueing. In 2008 another
neuropsychologist evaluated Rawdin. The results showed declarative memory
impairment that affected the ability to recall and process discrete bits of unrelated
information (Rawdin v. The American Board of Pediatrics, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
159458 at *1-*16). At the time of the case, he was a practicing pediatrician who had
failed the American Board of Pediatrics certification examination five times. Testing
accommodations of double time, individual testing room, 3.5 hours per day maximum
testing, and periodic breaks were provided the fifth time.
Upon review, the court noted the ADAAA had rejected the past strict
interpretation and demanding standard for qualifying as disabled under the ADA, and
referenced the revised EEOC regulations. The court stated: “Thus ‘an impairment need
not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major
life activity’…nor should the ‘threshold issue of whether an impairment ‘substantially
limits’ a major life activity…demand extensive analysis.’ [29 C.F.R.]
§1630.2(j)(1)(ii),(iii).” The court further noted that an impairment must substantially
limit the performance of a major life activity “as compared to most people in the general
population.” However, this inquiry will not usually require scientific, medical or
statistical evidence but such evidence may be used in cases that are appropriate (citing 29
C.F.R. §1630.2(j)(1)(ii),(v); Rawdin v. The American Board of Pediatrics, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 159458 at *31-*34).
The court easily found that Rawdin suffered from a memory impairment that
impacted the major life activities of test-taking and working. Accordingly, the
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dispositive issue for determining disability was whether his impairment substantially
limited the ability of test-taking or working. The court emphasized that Rawdin must be
compared to members of the general population, citing the pre-ADAAA cases of Singh
and Wong that were rejected by Congress. Further emphasis was made that the ADAAA
“did not eliminate the requirement that an individual’s substantial limitation be measured
in comparison to the general population.” The court also cited the Bartlett case in
support of this point although Bartlett was found to meet the pre-ADAAA standard, and
was endorsed by Congress in the ADAAA legislative history. The court then concluded
that Rawdin was not substantially limited because his test-taking skills were not lower
than the average person in the general population, citing the pre-ADAAA Gonzales case
that was rejected by Congress, and the Rumbin and Healy cases (Id., 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 159458 at *38-*41).
The court went on to find that the requested testing accommodations were not
reasonable because they would fundamentally alter the test by devaluing board
certification. This conclusion was based on a comparison to the analysis whether
academic accommodations fundamentally alter curriculum. However, the ADAAA
refers to “academic requirements in postsecondary education” but does not include
testing accommodations specifically (ADAAA Section 6(a)(1), (2008)). Accordingly, the
legal analysis concerning deference given to postsecondary education is not necessarily
applicable to a testing entity. Additionally, the court found that the requested
modification of the test format would fundamentally alter the measure of the knowledge
being tested, citing 28 C.F.R. §36.309(b)(3). However, the cited regulation pertains to
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“auxiliary aids” without mention of test format modification (Rawdin v. The American
Board of Pediatrics, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159458 at *45-*54). It should also be noted
that another court facing a similar request for physician board certification stated that
waiver of an oral section of the exam may be a reasonable accommodation depending
upon the extent of a disability and the value of the section of the exam at issue (Shaywitz
v. American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology, 675 F. Supp. 2d 376, 390-91 (S.D. N.Y.
2009), summary judgment entered for defendant on other grounds, 848 F. Supp. 2d 460
(S.D. N.Y. 2012)).
Rawdin requested an oral component modification noting that other certification
boards and the ABP previously had used oral components. The court rejected this
argument giving total deference to the ABP, and further found that modification of the
test format would be cost prohibitive, and therefore an undue burden (Rawdin v. The
American Board of Pediatrics, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159458 at *54-*57).
Discussion
The first purpose of this study was to establish the legal standard of disability
under the ADA prior to the enactment of the ADAAA. Disability is defined as when a
physical or mental impairment substantially limits one or more major life activity of an
individual (42 U.S.C. §12102(1)(A)). The research indicates this definition was strictly
interpreted by the Supreme Court and lower federal courts to create a demanding legal
standard to establish disability under the ADA. Specifically, the findings indicate that the
term “substantially limits” was interpreted to mean “prevents or severely restricts” the
performance of a major life activity. The term “major life activity” was interpreted to
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mean an activity that is of “central importance to most people’s daily lives.”
Additionally, the court held that the “ameliorative effects of mitigating measures” must
be considered in determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life
activity.
After having determined this prior standard, the purpose of this research was to
ascertain the new legal standard following enactment of the ADAAA. The research
findings indicate that the ADA was extensively rewritten by Congress to override the
strict interpretation by the courts. This intent is evidenced in the legislative history and
language of the statute itself. Specifically, Congress overruled the Supreme Court cases
in the language of the ADAAA, and repudiated several lower federal court decisions
concerning postsecondary education in the legislative history. Additionally, the EEOC
was instructed to revise its administrative regulations that had defined “substantially
limited” as “significantly restricted” because that standard was also seen as being too
demanding.
The terms “prevents or severely restricts” and “significantly restricts were
negated as being inconsistent with the broad remedial purposes of the ADA.
Consideration of the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures was explicitly rejected.
The term “major life activity” was defined for the first time in the statute to emphasize
the broad span of covered activities as opposed to be limited to only activities that are of
central importance to most people’s daily lives. The mechanism utilized was to provide a
non-exhaustive list of major life activities, and to further include a non-exhaustive list of
major bodily functions that are considered to be major life activities.
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Rules of construction were included to direct courts in interpreting the meaning of
the law in future litigation. The new standard of disability was intended to be construed
to provide greater coverage than previously. However, the ADAAA failed to specifically
define the term “substantially limits” because there was disagreement concerning this
issue. The House of Representatives bill had specifically defined this term as “materially
restricts.” The Senate would not agree to this language. In the end the Senate prevailed
and instead the term “substantially limits” would be determined through rules of
construction that must be applied on a case-by-case basis. This compromise may turn out
to be problematic as courts address this issue.
As a matter of law, the rules of construction dictate that substantially limits has to
be construed in favor of broad coverage to the maximum extent under the ADA, and
consistently with the findings and purposes of the ADAAA. The statute further directs
that the determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity
be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures. It is fairly
easy to apply the rule that an impairment must be assessed in an unmitigated state (except
for routine eyeglasses and contact lens). However, what does broad coverage to the
maximum extent under the ADA and interpretation consistent with the findings and
purposes of the ADAAA actually mean? The new standard is obviously imprecise and
subject to varied interpretations.
The revised EEOC regulations offer some assistance. They indicate that disability
determination is a threshold standard that does not demand extensive analysis and is met
by a functional limitation that is less than the standard applied prior to the ADAAA.
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However, a specific definition is still lacking. The revised regulations also add another
consideration that has the potential to create even more ambiguity concerning the
definition of disability. Under the regulations, the determination of a substantial
limitation of a major life activity is made in comparison to “most people in the general
population.” This language is open to multiple interpretations. The regulations state that
usually scientific, medical or statistical evidence will not be necessary but may be used
where appropriate. Also, in determining substantial limitation in comparison to most
people the condition, manner, and duration it takes to perform an activity must be taken
into consideration, which includes difficulty, effort or time to perform the subject
activity. Again, these are terms that are open to varied interpretations.
Most of the early case law interpreting the ADAAA has been positive in terms of
expanding coverage (NCD, 2013). However, some courts have focused on the issue of
comparison to most people in the general population as a limiting factor that is relied
upon in finding that someone is not an individual with a disability. For example, in Allen
v. Southcrest Hospital (2011), the court referred to multiple limitations from the
plaintiff’s impairment but then summarily concluded she was not substantially limited in
caring for herself “as compared to the average person in the general population.”
Although most of the case law to date has favored expanding coverage, three
cases concerning postsecondary education and testing applied a strict interpretation of
this regulation resulting in a denial of coverage under the ADA. In Rumbin v.
Association of American Medical Colleges (2011), Healy v. National Board of
Osteopathic Medical Examiners (2012), and Rawdin v. The American Board of
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Pediatrics (2013) the courts each found that the plaintiffs were not substantially limited
in a major life activity when compared to most people in the general population. These
decisions essentially ignored the mandate of the ADAAA and EEOC regulations that the
threshold determination of disability must be interpreted in favor of broad coverage and
is not a demanding standard that requires extensive analysis. The courts further applied a
strict interpretation to the comparison to most people requirement of the EEOC
regulations that is not even contained in the ADAAA.
This interpretation countermands the intent of Congress as set forth in the statute
and legislative history. It is also based on a restrictive interpretation of the regulations
that is contrary to the intent of the EEOC by relying heavily on scientific, medical and
statistical information, and failing to take into account the condition, manner, and
duration it takes to perform the subject major life activities as compared to most people.
This regulatory comparison group standard that was not addressed in the text of the
ADAAA has created a loophole for courts to circumvent the mandate of broad coverage
set forth in the statute. Although this position is contrary to Congressional intent and text
of the EEOC regulations that students who have performed well academically cannot be
substantially limited in the activities of learning, reading, writing, thinking,
concentrating, or speaking, these decisions further relied on past academic achievement
to support findings of no disability.
The determination of substantial limitation of a major life activity as compared to
most people is a threshold standard that is required to be construed in favor of eligibility
as opposed to being strictly construed against eligibility as in the above-referenced
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decisions. Judicial interpretation of the comparison group of most people that is in
accordance with the ADAAA is found in the pre-ADAAA decision in Bartlett v. New
York State Board of Law Examiners (2001).
Bartlett involved a law school graduate with dyslexia who had been denied
accommodations for the New York Bar Exam. The court found that a learning disability
cannot be determined by psychometric testing alone and that clinical judgment is an
essential part of the diagnosis of a learning disability. The court concluded there was a
substantial limitation in reading because most people do not read with the level of
difficulty experienced by the plaintiff. Accordingly, she was substantially limited in
comparison to most people, notwithstanding that she had compensated through selfaccommodations. Accommodations that mitigate the impact of the impairment merely
assist in function but do not affect the impairment itself. Successful outcomes alone do
not negate the underlying disability. There must be consideration of the condition,
manner, or duration in which activities are performed in comparison to most people
(Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11926 at
*68, *92, *113, *117-19, *120-21, * 130-34). The application of the ADAAA standards
in Peters v. University of Cincinnati College of Medicine (2012) is similar where the
court found that a medical student was substantially limited in learning because she
struggled more than most people in processing information although she was able to
achieve academic success. In Doe v. Samuel Merritt University (2013), the court’s
reliance on both the statute and regulation further provided emphasis and authority for a
liberal interpretation of these terms.
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The impact for postsecondary education is how the comparison group issue will
be applied by institutions of higher education. It may be strictly applied as in the
Rumbin, Healy, and Rawdin cases or it may be more liberally applied as in the Bartlett,
Doe, and Peters decisions. Further guidance will be provided as more courts address this
issue. Other trial courts may find one interpretation more persuasive than the other, or
even provide a different interpretation. Appellate court decisions that set precedent will
provide more guidance. In the event there are opposing interpretations issued by the
Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court may have to address this issue in the future.
Limitations
This study is based on legal research and provides analysis of multiple primary
sources of law. The legal precedent prior to the enactment of the ADAAA is well
documented by the Supreme Court, lower federal courts, and the EEOC regulations over
a period of more than eighteen years. The statutory language of the ADAAA is finite and
codified in the United States Code. The legislative history is set forth in extensive
published reports form the House of Representatives and Mangers of the Senate bill that
actually became legislation. The amended EEOC regulations are codified in the Code of
Federal Regulations and extensive commentary was provided in the Federal Register
upon publication. Accordingly, these sources of law pertaining to the ADAAA are
developed and not subject to change, unless amended in the future.
Judicial case law interpreting the ADAAA is under development. Under the legal
system the courts are charged with interpretation of the law, which may include review of
statutes, regulations, legislative history, and prior case law. The litigation process takes a
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great deal of time to develop case law through the appellate stage, and especially to the
Supreme Court. The ADAAA has been in effect a little more than five years.
Accordingly, there is limited appellate case law interpreting the amended legal standards
set forth in the ADAAA. Case law at the trial level relevant to postsecondary education
has been developed to an extent. This process is fluid as courts build upon the
interpretation and rulings of other courts pertaining to specific legal issues presented in
litigation. The limited amount of decisions available to date and early development of
case law is a significant limitation on this study. Accordingly, case law needs to be
closely monitored and reviewed on an ongoing basis as the decisional law develops.
Conclusions
Despite these limitations, the research at this point indicates that Congress has
acted directly and in a strong manner to correct the past misinterpretations of the ADA.
The statutory language of the ADAAA is explicit and provides specific guidance in
statutory construction to courts that must apply the new legal standards from the
legislation. Congress has further provided evidence of its intent in enacting the ADAAA
through comprehensive legislative reports. The result, as indicated by initial case law, is
that the definition of disability has been broadened to be more inclusive. More people
will become eligible for coverage under the ADA and the focus of inquiry will change to
whether there has been discrimination on the basis of disability. In the realm of
postsecondary education prior academic success should not be an impediment to
eligibility, and therefore, more students should receive academic accommodations and
modifications to attain access to education programs.
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However, case law at the trial level has gone both ways on this issue in
postsecondary education. Some courts have issued liberal interpretations of the ADAAA
in finding coverage under the ADA that was not available previously. However, some
courts have interpreted the ADAAA more strictly and specifically have denied coverage
under the ADAAA standards based on strict interpretation of the requirement that an
individual be substantially limited in the performance of a major life activity in
comparison to most people. They have also cited past academic achievement as negating
substantial limitation in the ability to learn. Accordingly, the definition of the new legal
standard of disability under the ADA will be the subject of more litigation and eventually
appellate decisional law. The legal definition of disability will become more definitive as
this process continues.
Further research is necessary concerning the issues of determining substantial
limitation in comparison to most people in the general population and the interpretation
of past academic success as indicating an impairment does not substantially limit the
ability to learn, think, read, communicate, concentrate, or test-taking. Additionally,
further research is needed due to the shift in the legal analysis from determining the
threshold standard of eligibility to determining the scope of reasonable accommodations,
and when an accommodation becomes unreasonable as a fundamental alteration of
postsecondary curriculum or imposes an undue hardship on the postsecondary institution.
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Table 1
Summary of the Legislative History of the ADAAA

Broadening the Definition of Disability
1) The ADA requires a broad construction of the definition of disability and deletes
sections of the ADA that were interpreted by the courts to limit coverage.
2) Courts have narrowed the interpretation of disability resulting in a large number
of people with substantially limiting impairments not to be considered people
with disabilities.
3) The ADAAA will lower the standard of establishing disability for the purpose of
coverage under the ADA and reinstates the intent of Congress that the definition
of disability is to be interpreted broadly and inclusively.
4) The definition of disability is amended by clarifying the terms “substantially
limits” and “major life activities”, and creating rules of construction that add
several standards to be applied when considering the definition of disability.
5) The establishment of coverage should not be overly complex or difficult and will
be a lesser standard than interpreted by the courts.
Definition of the Term Substantially Limits
1) Rejects that Supreme Court has defined “substantially limits” as “prevents or
severely restricts” which has resulted in the exclusion of many individuals that
were intended to be covered.
2) The limitation of an impairment is a lesser standard that need not rise to the level
of severely restricting or significantly restricting the ability to perform a major life
activity.
3) Proposed legislation rejects Supreme Court decision that “substantially” and
“major” need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard to qualify
as disabled, and instead should be construed broadly.
4) The standard for determining substantial limitation is not “materially restricts”
because the lack of clarity in the terms material, moderate, and severe will only
encourage courts to engage in an inappropriate level of scrutiny when determining
disability.
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5) Substantially limits is not meant to be a demanding standard and is properly
construed pursuant to the findings and purposes of the proposed legislation to
ensure the provision of reasonable accommodations or modifications to
individuals with impairments.
6) Using the correct standard that is lower than the demanding standard created by
the Supreme Court will make disability determination an appropriate threshold
issue but not an onerous burden for those seeking accommodations or
modifications.
Application to Specific Learning Disabilities
1) Some courts have found that students who attain a high level of academic
achievement are not considered individuals with disabilities, and may have
difficulty demonstrating substantial limitations in learning or reading relative to
“most people.”
2) In considering the condition, manner or duration in which an individual with a
specific learning disability performs a major life activity it is critical to reject the
assumption that an individual who performs well academically can not be
substantially limited in learning, reading, writing, thinking, or speaking.
3) The comparison of individuals with specific learning disabilities requires a careful
analysis of the method and manner the impairment limits a majority life activity.
For the majority of the population the basic mechanics of reading and writing are
effortless, unconscious and automatic processes. The process of reading for an
individual with a neurologically based reading impairment is cumbersome,
painful, deliberate and slow throughout life. Individuals with specific learning
disabilities will be better protected under the ADAAA.
Major Life Activities
1) The ADAAA provides significant new guidance and clarification on the subject
of major life activities.
2) An impairment need only substantially limit one major life activity to be
considered a disability under the ADA.
3) A non-exhaustive illustrative list of major life activities is added to the ADA in
the proposed legislation, and also adds the operation of major bodily functions as
part of major life activities.
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Ameliorative Effects of Mitigating Measures
1) Consideration of the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures when
determining whether an individual’s impairment substantially limits a major life
activity is prohibited, overruling the Supreme Court on this issue.
2) Mitigating measures include medication, assistive technology, accommodations
and modifications.
3) An individual should not be penalized for managing adaptive strategies or
received informal or undocumented accommodations that have lessened the
deleterious impact of a disability.
4) Upon elimination of the consideration of ameliorative effects of mitigating
measures, individuals who were improperly excluded from coverage will be
found substantially limited and entitled to protection from disability based
discrimination.
The ADAAA as Comprehensive Antidiscrimination Legislation
1) The critical inquiry is whether a qualified person has been discriminated against
on the basis of disability, and not focused on the preliminary question of whether
someone is an individual with a disability.
2) The changes enacted by the ADAAA will make the threshold definition of
disability, under which individuals qualify for protection from discrimination,
more generous, and will result in coverage for some individuals who were
previously excluded from protection.
3) The determination of disability is a necessary threshold issue but an appropriately
generous standard on that issue will allow courts to focus primarily on whether
discrimination has occurred or accommodations improperly refused.
[H.R. Rep. No. 110-730, pt. 1, at 7-16 (2008); H.R. Rep. No. 110-730, pt. 2, at 5
(2008);154 Cong. Rec. S8344-47 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008)]
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Table 2
Summary of the Major Provisions of the ADAAA

Section 2 – Findings
1) The ADA was intended to provide broad coverage to eliminate discrimination
against individuals with disabilities.
2) Supreme Court narrowed definition of disability and eliminated protection for
individuals.
3) Term “substantially limits” was interpreted restrictively and set too high a
standard for eligibility by the Supreme Court and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission
4) Relying on the Supreme Court lower courts incorrectly found that individuals
with a range of impairments are not people with disabilities.
Section 2 - Purposes
1) To reinstate the broad scope of protection under the ADA.
2) Rejection of the Supreme Court cases that created a demanding legal standard to
qualify for coverage under the ADA.
3) To reverse the restrictive standard from the Supreme Court as applied by the
lower courts and provide that the question of whether an individual’s impairment
is a disability should not demand extensive analysis.
4) Need to revise administrative regulations pertaining to the term “substantially
limits” to be consistent with the changes in the ADAAA.
Section 4 – Disability Defined
1) Major life activities are defined to include caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending,
speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating,
and working.
2) Major life activities include the operation of major bodily functions. These
include functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel,
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bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive
functions.
Section 4 – Rules of Construction Regarding the Definition of Disability
1) Definition of disability shall be construed in favor of broad coverage to maximum
extent under the ADAAA.
2) Term “substantially limits” shall be interpreted consistently with findings and
purposes of the ADAAA.
3) An impairment that substantially limits only one major life activity is considered a
disability.
4) An impairment that is episodic or in remission if it would be substantially limiting
if active.
5) The determination of whether an impairment is substantially limiting shall be
made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures.
[ADAAA of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3353-3356]
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Table 3
Summary of the EEOC Regulations Implementing the ADAAA

Rules of Construction to Determine Substantial Limitation of a Major Life Activity
1) Substantially limits shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage to
the maximum extent under the ADA, and is not a demanding standard.
2) The comparison group is most people in the general population, but an impairment
does not have to prevent, or significantly or severely restrict the performance of a
major life activity to be considered substantially limiting.
3) The threshold issue whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity
should not demand extensive analysis.
4) An individualized assessment is required for determination of limitations and the
term substantially limits requires a degree of functional limitation that is lower than
the standard applied prior to the ADAAA.
5) Comparison of an individual’s performance of a major life activity to most people
in the general population does not require scientific, medical or statistical evidence,
but may be used if appropriate.
6) Determination of substantial limitation must be made without regard to the
ameliorative effects of mitigating measures, except for ordinary eyeglasses and
contact lenses.
7) An impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would
substantially limit a major life activity when active.
8) There only needs to be substantial limitation of one major life activity to be
considered a substantially limiting impairment.
9) The effects of an impairment lasting or expected to last less than six months can be
substantially limiting.
Condition, Manner, or Duration Required to Perform a Major Life Activity
1) In determining substantial limitation of a major life activity, consideration of the
condition under which the major life activity is performed; manner in which the
major life activity is performed; and/or the duration of time it takes to perform a
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major life activity, or for which the major life can be performed, as compared to
most people in the general population.
2) Consideration of the condition, manner or duration may include difficulty, effort,
or time required to perform a major life activity; the length of time a major life
activity can be performed; and/or how an impairment affects the operation of a
major bodily function. Also, the negative side effects of mitigating measures, such
as medication, may be considered in determining the substantial limitation of a
major life activity.
3) The focus is on the limiting effect of an impairment and not the outcome
achieved. Someone with a learning disability may achieve a high level of
academic success but may be substantially limited in learning due to additional
time or effort needed to read, write, or learn compared to most people.
[EEOC Regulations, 76 Fed. Reg. 17,000-17,001 (March 25, 2011), 29 C.F.R.
§1630.2(j)(1),(4)]
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Abstract
The Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 expanded the legal
definition of disability to establish broader coverage for individuals with disabilities,
including college students, than the definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990. The new definition of disability shifted the main purpose of documentation from
proving eligibility for services as a person with a disability to determining appropriate
academic accommodations. This change in the law enhances the importance of
documentation from a student’s secondary education experience that may provide
relevant information concerning functional limitations and the need for academic
accommodations. This article provides practical guidance to high school professional
staff in preparing disability documentation for students’ transition to college.
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The Impact of the ADAAA on Documentation of Disability for Students
with Learning Disabilities and ADHD Transitioning from High School to College
According to the National Longitudinal Transition Study-2, postsecondary
education is a primary goal for 80% of high school students with disabilities (Newman,
Wagner, Cameto, & Knokey, 2009). In order to receive disability-based services in
college, students must self-identify with the campus Office of Disability Services (ODS)
and provide documentation to establish eligibility. College ODS personnel are allowed to
require documentation of disability that established a substantial limitation in performing
a learning related activity such as reading (Madaus & Shaw, 2007; U.S. Department of
Education, Office for Civil Rights, 2011a). This documentation of disability is also a
necessary component of establishing eligibility for accommodations in college. However,
a key issue for students in transition is providing the correct type and amount of
documentation. Colleges may set their own documentation requirements but they must be
reasonable and comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).
However some colleges have strict documentation standards that require extensive and
recent evaluations to establish a learning disability or ADHD (U.S. Department of
Education, Office for Civil Rights, 2011b).
Traditionally, there has been a disconnect between high schools and colleges in
regard to the requirements regarding the documentation of disability. This
“documentation divide” came about because of the differences in eligibility under the
legal requirements of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the
ADA, which applies to postsecondary institutions (deBetttencourt, 2002). For example,
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many colleges routinely required students with learning disabilities to submit
comprehensive psychoeducational evaluations to establish eligibility for services
(Madaus, Banerjee, & Hamblet, 2010). Often, a specific discrepancy between ability and
academic achievement measured through standardized testing was required. Requiring
this level of documentation was in accordance with the strict legal interpretation of the
ADA by the Supreme Court. However, that strict standard was overruled by Congress
through the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008
(ADAAA). Accordingly, with the changes in practice and the law there is a need to
revisit the role of documentation from high school to support requests for
accommodations in college.
The New Legal Definition of Disability Under the ADAAA
Prior to the enactment of the ADAAA, the legal interpretation of disability was
strict and resulted in many people with significant impairments not being eligible for
protection under the ADA. In a series of rulings, the Supreme Court held that the impact
of an individual’s impairment must be assessed with consideration of the ameliorative
effects of mitigating measures, including medication, auxiliary aids, and informal selfaccommodations (Sutton v. United Airlines, 1999). The Court also held that an
impairment must prevent or severely limit the performance of an activity of central
importance to most people’s daily lives (Toyota Motor Manufacturing Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams, 2002). Although these rulings were based on employment cases, their impact
rippled into the field of education, and courts ruled that students with learning disabilities
in postsecondary education were not eligible for protection under the ADA (Singh v.
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George Washington University School of Medicine and Health Services, 2007; Wong v.
Regents of the University of California, 2005).
The ADAAA became effective on January 1, 2009, with the main purpose to
reinstate the broad scope of protection for individuals with disabilities that was originally
intended under the ADA. The ADAAA sets forth the need to provide an extensive
revision to the law and for the first time provides a specific definition of disability (see
Box 1, “Summary of the Major Provisions of the ADAAA”). The changes include for the
first time a non-exhaustive list of major life activities that were absent. This list sets forth
learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, and communicating as specific major life
activities of particular relevance to secondary and postsecondary education. The law also
includes the operation of major bodily functions, such as neurological and brain
functions, as major life activities.
[Insert Box 1]
Even more important is how the ADAAA addresses the term “substantially
limits.” Instead of providing a specific definition such as “moderately restricts” or
“significantly restricts”, this term must be defined on a case-by-case basis (see Box 2,
“Interpreting the Definition of Disability”). Under the ADAAA, the terms “substantially
limits” and “major life activity” must be interpreted to expand coverage of individuals
under the ADA to prevent discrimination on the basis of disability. Coverage is
expanded because it is easier to qualify for protection under the ADAAA. The
determination of disability was intended to be a threshold point that should be easily
established. The ADAAA restores the original intent that the focus of inquiry should be
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whether an individual with a disability is being granted equal access to postsecondary
education. Once disability is established, it is incumbent on the postsecondary institution
to consider reasonable accommodations and modifications to ensure equal access (Shaw,
Keenan, Madaus, & Banerjee, 2010). For example, a reasonable accommodation for a
student that has difficulty taking notes in class may be to receive copies of the lecture
notes in advance.
The effects of mitigating measures that lessen the impact of an impairment cannot
be considered when determining substantial limitation in performing a major life activity.
For example, the ability of a student with ADHD to concentrate and stay on task may
increase while taking medication. However, the medication has not changed the
impairment but has mitigated or lessened the impact of the impairment. Accordingly,
when determining if ADHD substantially limits the major life activity of concentrating
the assessment should be done without taking medication that lessens the impact of the
impairment (ADAAA §4(a)). Likewise, the use of auxiliary aids or accommodations that
aid in reading cannot be considered when determining an impairment’s impact on reading
to an individual with dyslexia.
[Insert Box 2]
Impact of the ADAAA
The ADAAA has moved the focus of documentation from establishing the
presence of disability to assessing the impact of an impairment to determine appropriate
academic accommodations in college (Shaw, Keenan, Madaus, & Banerjee, 2010).
Under this broad standard, colleges will be hard pressed to find that high school students
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who received services and accommodations under the IDEA are not considered to be
individuals with disabilities under the ADA (Shaw, 2009). Students with learning
disabilities and ADHD will more readily come under the protection of the ADA and strict
documentation requirements developed prior to the ADAAA may no longer be
appropriate (Keenan & Shaw, 2011). The law has always required that colleges provide
reasonable accommodations to ensure equal access to postsecondary education programs.
However, now the main focus of documentation must shift from determining eligibility
for services to the functional limitation of an impairment to determine the need for
specific accommodations. Accordingly, the main purpose of documentation should now
focus on how learning is impacted, rather than on extensively proving there is a specific
disability.
Association on Higher Education And Disability Documentation Guidance
In response to the ADAAA and the changing definition of disability in general,
the Association of Higher Education And Disability (AHEAD), a professional association
that advocates full participation in postsecondary education for individuals with
disabilities, published guidance on documentation for supporting accommodations
requests in college that are in conformity with the ADAAA (AHEAD, 2012; see
www.ahead.org). The following acceptable forms of documentation for postsecondary
education accommodations are noted:
•

Primary documentation from the student’s self-report of functional limitation
from impairment;
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•

Secondary documentation from observation and interaction during interviews and
conversations or in evaluating previous implemented accommodations;

•

Tertiary documentation from external or third parties including the IEP, summary
of performance (SOP), teacher observations, in addition to assessments from
school psychologists, health care providers, and teachers.
The AHEAD guidance recommends consideration of the past use of

accommodations that have been effective through individual review to determine the
impact of the impairment on the student noting that a clear understanding establishes the
reasonableness of the accommodation for the individual. Documentation of these factors
in high school records will assist in determining appropriate academic accommodations
in college. However, this guidance is only advisory and colleges are not bound by the
AHEAD interpretation of the ADAAA. High school students entering college will
continue to see disparities in college documentation requirements. Accordingly,
transition planning must anticipate that some colleges will retain more restrictive preADAAA documentation guidelines. Therefore, relevant testing and other assessment
results should be included in transition documentation and especially any assessments
done while the student was in high school.
Focus on Documentation from High School
The main purpose of providing information from high school is to document that
a student is an individual with a disability and received specific services and
accommodations. Accordingly, high schools should provide documentation for transition
to college that explains how a disability limits the ability to learn and how high school
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accommodations have helped to compensate the impact of the student’s impairment
(Hamblet, 2014). The ADAAA makes documentation of functional impairment more
important than documentation that proves the existence of a disability. In this regard,
qualitative information from student high school records will become more relevant in
documenting eligibility and the need for accommodations in college. Postsecondary
education accommodations are based on the unique profile of the student, the functional
impact of an impairment, and how specific limitations affect learning in the
postsecondary academic setting (Lindstrom, 2007). The information from high school
provides recent documentation of the impact of an impairment on the ability to learn that
is very relevant to providing accommodations, and therefore, equal access to college
programs.
Due to these changes in the law the role of high school special educators in
providing transition documentation for college has become more relevant to college
disability determination. The IEP team and/or Section 504 team are instrumental in
creating documentation that will later assist the student in the transition from high school
to college. Input from high school educators and students with disabilities is now more
important under the focus on functionality and provision of effective accommodations
because all play a key role in the documentation process (see Box 3, “Secondary
Education Involvement In Transition Documentation”). Special education teachers and
school psychologists provide substantial input in the planning process and follow-up
documentation, and have the most direct contact with special education students. Regular
education teachers and school counselors have significant interaction with special
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education students, and even more interaction with students on Section 504 Plans that do
not usually receive special education services. In these roles, special and regular
educators are enabled to create documentation of disability through ongoing interaction
with students that is relevant to attaining coverage under the ADA in college. These
educators are important in gathering and assessing relevant information that is later
recorded in the student’s IEP, SOP or Section 504 Plan as objective documentation.
The National Transition Assessment Summit (2005) that created the model SOP
template was made up of representatives from secondary and postsecondary
organizations such as the Council for Exceptional Children, LDA and AHEAD.
Information from the model SOP such as transition goals, a history of functional
limitations and use and effectiveness of accommodations can help colleges make
accommodation determinations at the postsecondary level based on the broad ADAAA
specifications (Shaw, Keenan, Madaus & Banerjee, 2010). Research by de Vries and
Schmitt (2013) found that most postsecondary disability personnel rated the sections of
the Model Summary of Performance (Dukes, Shaw & Madaus, 2007) to be very useful to
extremely useful for making college accommodations decisions.
Past practices by many colleges have been to require scientific, medical, and
statistical data to establish eligibility under the ADA that was not available from high
school records or was not current enough to meet college documentation requirements to
determine eligibility under the ADA. The changes implemented under the ADAAA state
that this type of documentation will usually not be necessary (ADAAA Regulations, Title
I, 2013). The first purpose of transition documentation is to determine the presence of a
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disability to establish eligibility. Documentation from high school is relevant to this
issue. The second purpose is to determine functional impact that will guide the
determination of reasonable accommodations in college. Transition documentation that
provides information on functional limitation and prior successful accommodations is
even more relevant in determining these compensatory accommodations that will provide
equal access to postsecondary education in college.
[Insert Box 3]
Individual Student Documentation Transition to College
Documentation of disability is specific and unique for each student that transitions
from high school to college. Kellems & Morningstar (2010) recommend the
development of a notebook of important paperwork for postsecondary settings to provide
important information to the student in transition. Such materials may be invaluable to a
student with a disability upon entering college as a freshman. It is recommended that the
student participate in this process to be involved in planning for postsecondary education
and further develop self-determination and self-advocacy skills. Depending on the
circumstances of the individual student, the notebook may contain the following
documentation:
•

A complete copy of the most recent IEP or Section 504 plan noting
accommodations that were provided, the basis for using those accommodations
and transition goal planning;

•

A copy of the student’s SOP including academic achievement, functional
performance, and recommendations to assist in meeting postsecondary goals;
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•

History of receiving and utilization of accommodations in other settings, i.e., high
school competency examinations, SAT, ACT, middle school and elementary
school;

•

A statement developed by the student and professional staff that reflects upon the
effectiveness of accommodations that have been used in high school;

•

Most recent psychoeducational reports, neuropsychological reports, and other
assessment data and reports should be included as relevant in describing
functional deficits and the impact on the student’s ability to learn (Kellems &
Morningstar, 2010).

Final Thoughts
Changes in the definition of disability under the ADAAA has expanded coverage
for students with learning disabilities and ADHD in college, lessened the documentation
standards, and placed more of an emphasis on documentation from high school.
Documentation of disability is more qualitative and focuses on functional limitation.
However, it is important to remember that the impairment must be assessed without
consideration of mitigating measures that lessen functional impact (e.g., the use of
assistive technology, medicine). The AHEAD Guidance document notes that the primary
documentation in college should be more focused on student self-report of the functional
impact of a diagnosed impairment, and then secondary documentation of the impact of a
disability is obtained through observation and interaction with students. However, it
must be remembered that not all colleges follow the AHEAD recommendations, nor are
they required to do so.
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High school professionals are uniquely qualified to provide this documentation as
participant observers within secondary education. The documentation is provided
through the IEP or Section 504 Plan, and in some cases, the SOP. Prepared statements
that include written descriptions of the impairment, functional limitations, prescribed
accommodations, and the efficacy of utilized accommodations will be increasingly
important. However, because the use of accommodations in high school does not
automatically translate to receipt of accommodations in college, the most recent test
scores and evaluation results possible should also be included to support the diagnosis of
a specific disability, and functional limitation due to an impairment.
Other strategies may be employed to develop transition documentation.
Compilation of documentation in a notebook format provides objective evidence and
support in obtaining academic accommodations in college. This form of documentation
may be in an actual physical notebook with each section tabbed and labeled for easy
access. However, it may also be a virtual notebook in electronic format that may be
encrypted and sent to the college disability services provider via email prior to a face-toface meeting. Student self-determination and self-advocacy may be further developed
through exercises that practice requesting accommodations in college while in high
school. Part of such an exercise could include researching college disability
documentation guidelines to prepare documentation that is relevant to particular colleges.
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Box 1

Major Provisions of the ADAAA
Section 2 – Findings
•

The ADA was intended to provide broad coverage to eliminate discrimination
against individuals with disabilities.

•

Supreme Court narrowed definition of disability and eliminated protection for
individuals.

•

Term “substantially limits” was interpreted restrictively and set too high a
standard for eligibility by the Supreme Court and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.

•

Relying on the Supreme Court lower courts incorrectly found that individuals
with a range of impairments are not people with disabilities.

Section 2 - Purposes
•

To reinstate the broad scope of protection under the ADA.

•

Rejection of the Supreme Court cases that created a demanding legal standard to
qualify for coverage under the ADA.

•

To reverse the restrictive standard from the Supreme Court as applied by the
lower courts and provide that the question of whether an individual’s impairment
is a disability should not demand extensive analysis.

•

Need to revise administrative regulations pertaining to the term “substantially
limits” to be consistent with the changes in the ADAAA.

Section 4 – Disability Defined
•

Major life activities are defined to include caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending,
speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating,
and working.

•

Major life activities include the operation of major bodily functions. These
include functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel,
bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive
functions.
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Box 2

Interpreting the Definition of Disability
•

Definition of disability shall be interpreted in favor of broad coverage to
maximum extent under the ADAAA.

•

Term “substantially limits” shall be interpreted consistently with findings and
purposes of the ADAAA.

•

The determination of whether an impairment is substantially limiting shall be
made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures.

•

An impairment that substantially limits only one major life activity is considered a
disability.

•

An impairment that is episodic or in remission if it would be substantially limiting
if active.
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Box 3

Secondary Education Involvement in Transition Documentation
•

Student – Involvement is key to help understand nature of their disability,
functional impact of impairment, and to enhance self-determination and selfadvocacy in college. Should participate in development of IEP, 504 Plan and
SOP.

•

Special Education Teacher – Most familiar with IEP, academic
accommodations, student use of accommodations to achieve academic progress,
and consults with regular education teachers to assess effectiveness.

•

Regular Education Teacher – Familiar with special education students and IEP
accommodations through LRE inclusive classroom, and also with regular
education students who have accommodations from Section 504 plan; may
implement academic accommodations and assess effectiveness.

•

School Counselor – Assists students with search for college that is best fit and
assists with preparing disability documentation; also may be Section 504
coordinator who helped design and implement Section 504 plan accommodations.

•

School Psychologist – Plays key role as performing psychoeducational
assessments and interpretation to determine impact of impairment and provision
of accommodations; also will often provide ongoing counseling services that
provide further feedback on student needs for accommodations.

